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Abstract
Economic development is associated with the shift of production from the traditional sector
(e.g. traditional agriculture and the urban informal sector) to the modern sector (e.g. modern
manufacturing and commercial agriculture). Human capital accumulation, particularly, education
and job training of skilled workers, is a crucial factor in the modernization of an economy. Several
institutions such as the protection of property rights and the strength of the rule of law also
are considered essential. Thus, the government has an important role as the main provider of
’institution-maintaining’ services, although it often faces a difficulty in providing adequate amounts
of the services due to costly hiring of educated officers and tax avoidance.
This paper analyzes interactions among taxation, the provision of the public services, human
capital accumulation, and modernization, based on a dynamic dual economy model, which draws on
the Becker and Murphy (1992) model of skill and task specialization, and examines conditions for
successful development. Distributions of political power and wealth as well as sectoral productivities
and the cost of education affect the outcome qualitatively. In particular, the socially desirable
distribution of political power is such that educated (uneducated) individuals should have dominant
power at an early (late) stage of development. Further, it is shown that several novel or overlooked
inefficiencies arise naturally from realistic features of the model and appropriate redistribution can
correct the inefficiencies except at a fairly early stage of development.
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1 Introduction
Economic development is associated with the shift of production and employment from the traditional
sector (e.g. traditional agriculture and the urban informal sector) to the modern sector (e.g. modern
manufacturing and commercial agriculture). Since the modern sector employs advanced technologies
and thus requires a greater proportion of skilled workers, human capital accumulation is a crucial
factor in development. Job training of skilled workers as well as education are important in raising
the sector’s productivity, as suggested, for example, by the analysis of firm-level productivity in five
developing economies by Tan and Barta (1996).
Recently, several institutions too have come to be recognized as fundamental determinants of devel-
opment. For example, Rodrik et al. (2004) estimate relative contributions of institutions, geography,
and trade in determining income levels of nations, and find that by far the most important is the
quality of institutions, which is measured by a composite index (the rule of law index) developed
by Kaufmann et al. (2002) to capture the protection of property rights, the strength of the rule of
law, and the incidence of crime. Because these institutional measures reflect ’institution-maintaining’
public services greatly, the finding suggests that the government has an important role as the main
provider of such services.
The government in a developing economy, however, often faces a difficulty in providing adequate
amounts of the services, because it needs to hire educated officers who are highly costly due to skill
scarcity, and, if it imposes a high tax rate to raise enough revenue, economic activities escape to the
traditional sector for tax avoidance.1 Inadequate supplies of the services, by contrast, would result in
low productivity, particularly, of the modern sector that relies much more on the services, a small size
of the modern sector, and low returns to human capital investment. Thus, a choice of the tax rate,
which would be affected by the distribution of political power over the population, are likely to be
critical for the economy’s fate.
This paper analyzes interactions among the above-mentioned factors – taxation, the provision of the
governmental services, human capital accumulation, and modernization – employing a dynamic dual
economy model, which draws on the Becker and Murphy (1992) model of skill and task specialization,
and examines conditions for successful development. Distributions of political power and wealth as
well as sectoral productivities and the cost of education affect the outcome qualitatively. In particular,
the socially desirable distribution of political power is such that educated (uneducated) individuals
should have dominant power at an early (late) stage of development. Further, it is shown that several
novel or overlooked inefficiencies arise naturally from realistic features of the model and appropriate
redistribution can correct the inefficiencies except at a fairly early stage of development.
The model is concerned with a small open economy that comprises up to two sectors producing
the final good: the traditional sector (sector T ) employing unskilled workers, and the modern sector
1Schneider (2005) finds that the tax and social security payment burden is among the most important factors affecting
the size of the unofficial (informal) economy in both developing and developed countries.
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(sector M ) employing skilled as well as unskilled workers. More specifically, in sector M, the final
good is produced using unskilled workers and the intermediate product, which in turn is produced by
combining constant varieties of ’tasks’ performed by skilled workers. Each task requires a task-specific
skill developed through time-consuming training. As is stressed by Becker (1981) and Rosen (1983),
since the development of task-specific skills exhibits increasing returns in nature, an increase in the
degree of skill and task specialization among skilled workers raises the sector’s productivity. However,
with a higher degree of specialization, a greater number of skilled workers of distinct specialization
must be involved in the production, which raises the cost of coordinating their activities. Hence, the
degree of specialization is limited by the coordination cost, as in Becker and Murphy (1992).
Unlike Becker and Murphy, however, the government plays a role in reducing the coordination
cost. The government imposes a value-added tax on sector M (sector T avoids taxation) and employs
skilled workers to provide the cost-reducing service.2 Real-life examples of the service include the
maintenance of law and order, the establishment and enforcement of property rights, the regulation
of economic activities in areas with non-negligible market failures, and, when market incompleteness
is severe, the provision of credit and information stimulating market transactions. Qualitative results
are not affected by including unproductive public services into the model.
The dynamic structure of the model is of an OLG variety. An individual, who is born identical to
others in terms of abilities and preferences, lives for two periods. In childhood, she receives a transfer
from the parent to invest in assets and education. Education is required to become a skilled worker,
but its direct cost must be financed by the received transfer due to a lack of loan markets for the
investment. In adulthood, she becomes a skilled or unskilled worker depending on the educational
choice. (When she chooses a skilled job, she devotes a portion of time to develop task-specific skills.)
Then, she receives labor and capital incomes and spends them on the consumption of the final good and
a transfer to a single child, from which she derives utility (impure altruism). Generations go by in this
fashion. Individuals of the same generation are heterogeneous in terms of education and wealth due to
differences in received transfers and the credit constraint. The distribution of wealth determines the
proportion of individuals accessible to education, and the proportion, the amount of the governmental
service, and the tax rate determine the return to education and thus the proportion of individuals
taking education (skilled workers) and the sectoral composition of production and employment.
In order to illuminate the dynamics of the economic structure, the simplest case is examined
first, in which the tax rate is fixed and all lineages can access education eventually (through wealth
accumulation) irrespective of the initial distribution of wealth. The tax rate affects the dynamics
critically. If the rate is too high or too low, nobody takes education, sector M is not in operation, and
output is lowest. When the tax rate is too low, the educational investment is not profitable because
a lack of the governmental service results in limited specialization among skilled workers and thus
low productivity in sector M. When the rate is too high, what makes education unrewarding is the
2The government does not provide services that directly affect consumers’ utilities.
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tax burden that more than offsets the resultant high degree of specialization and induces unskilled
workers, who are complementary to skilled workers in sector M, to choose sector T for tax avoidance.
In contrast, if the rate is in the intermediate range, the proportion of educated and thus skilled workers
increases and production and employment shift from sector T to sector M over time. The growth of
sector M raises tax revenue and the government too expands. Unskilled workers also shift to sector
M, because higher numbers of skilled workers in sector M and in the government have, ceteris paribus,
positive effects on the sector’s productivity. After sector T ceases operation, the wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers falls over time, and, in the long run, the skilled wage net of the
education cost is equalized to the unskilled wage and the structural change ends.
In this economy, unless the tax rate is extreme, overeducation is inevitable in the long run: the
proportion of educated individuals is higher than the socially optimal level (in terms of efficiency).3
The reason is that only the educated benefit directly from employment opportunities at the government
and thus the private return to education is higher than the social return. Overeducation occurs only
at a late stage of development, since the social return is positive while not many can access education.
The fact that only the educated benefit directly from governmental positions, together with the absence
of taxation in sector T, also leads to the oversized traditional sector at an early stage.
Next, the tax rate is endogenized to examine effects of the distribution of political power (as before,
all lineages can access education eventually). The rate is chosen by a politically influential group so as
to maximize their incomes in each period.4 Since educated and uneducated individuals have different
stakes in the tax policy, the outcome when the educated choose the policy is contrasted with the other
case. When only sector M is active (at an equilibrium tax rate), the rate selected by the educated (the
uneducated) is higher (lower) than the socially optimal rate, because the educated overevaluate the
contribution of the governmental service (thus taxation) on output and the uneducated underevaluate
it. By contrast, when sector T too is in operation, the tax rate chosen by the educated is best in the
competitive economy but is lower than the optimal rate, while the uneducated are indifferent among
any rates (thus they may choose an extreme rate that forbids production in sector M). Considering
this result and the fact that, under the dominance of the uneducated, inequality is lower and structural
change when sector T is not active is faster (since the unskilled wage is higher), the socially desirable
distribution of political power is such that the educated should have decisive power while sector T
is active, i.e. at a relatively early stage of development, whereas the uneducated too should have
influence on the policy at the later stage.
The preceding results show that both groups cannot choose the tax rate and thus the size of public
service optimally, nor can they avoid overeducation at a late stage and oversized sector T at an early
3To be exact, the optimal level is defined to be the one maximizing aggregate labor income net of the education cost,
which is a measure of aggregate (private) consumption for given aggregate assets.
4 As for the timing of the policy decision, two cases are considered. In the commitment case, the tax rate that is
optimal to them before education is completed is implemented in adulthood. By contrast, in the non-commitment case,
the tax rate can be chosen after education and thus an ex-ante optimal rate may not be implemented. This paper mainly
focuses on the commitment case because one of results of the other case is not robust under a more realistic setting.
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stage. Things are different if redistribution is feasible. Suppose that the government can impose
a proportional tax on wages generated in non-traditional sectors and use the revenue to provide a
lump-sum transfer to the sectors’ workers with political power.5 Then, when only sector M is active
without redistribution, both groups choose the optimal value-added tax rate. Intuitively, in order to
take as much as possible from the other group through redistribution, the powerful group take into
account effects of taxation not only on their wage but also on the opponent’s wage. Further, when the
uneducated determine policies, overeducation can be avoided, and efficient and equitable allocation is
realized in the long run.6 This is because redistribution from the educated to the uneducated corrects
the excessive private return to education. In contrast, when sector T is active without redistribution,
if the educated have power, redistribution is not implemented and the outcome is same as before,
whereas the result changes greatly if the uneducated have power: if the educated are not very scarce,
efficient allocation is attained with sector T shut down (redistribution corrects the insufficient return
to choosing sector M) and the value-added tax set optimally (higher than the rate chosen by the
educated), while otherwise, sector M becomes oversized and/or inefficiency may worsen compared to
the economy without redistribution. Hence, the uneducated should have decisive power from an earlier
stage than the previous economy, i.e. even when sector T is active without redistribution.
Finally, the case in which the initial distribution of wealth affects the long-run outcome, which is
when the productivity of sector T is low relative to the education cost, is examined. Now choices of
policies are even more critical because they determine, through effects on disposable incomes, whether
descendants of each type of workers can access education or not. In the exogenous tax case, if the
tax rate is extreme, irrespective of the initial distribution, nobody can access education and only
sector T is in operation in the long run. Otherwise, when the initial distribution is such that only
a small portion of individuals can afford education at the beginning and/or the tax rate is high or
low, skilled workers are limited in number, the government is small, and the wage inequality persists
in the long run. When the initial distribution and the tax rate are appropriate, by contrast, the
economy succeeds in complete modernization and the inequality disappears eventually.7 Depending
on the tax rate, the long-run outcome can be very different even when the initial distribution of wealth
is identical. Because income levels of unskilled workers are critical for successful structural change, in
the endogenous tax case, the uneducated should control the policy from a lower stage of development
than the economy in which the initial distribution does not matter. For example, it is possible that the
5The transfer to the educated may be interpreted as benefits and privileges associated with pollical power. When
only non-targeted transfer is available, results when the educated (the uneducated) have power are same as the original
economy without (with) redistribution.
6While the social return to education is non-negative, efficient allocation is realized when the educated choose policies
too. However, overeducation arises eventually: in the commitment case (footnote 4), redistribution is not implemented
and the outcome is same as before at the last stage, and overeducation worsens in the non-commitment case.
7Consistent with the model’s implications, Deininger and Olinto (2000) find that an economy’s growth rate is affected
negatively by initial land inequality (a proxy for initial wealth inequality) and positively by its mean years of schooling per
working person, which in turn is negatively affected by the initial inequality. Easterly (2007) finds that higher structural
inequality, which he claims reflects such historical events as conquest, colonization, slavery, and land distribution by the
state or colonial power, leads to a lower level of development, worse institutions, and less education.
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economy remains stagnant under the political dominance of the educated but it succeeds in structural
change under the dominance of the uneducated. In particular, when the educated have power and can
employ a redistributive policy, the economy inevitably stagnates.
Main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, as mentioned earlier, it analyzes interactions
among taxation, the provision of the public service, human capital accumulation, and modernization
based on a dynamic dual economy model, and examines conditions for successful development. Further,
effects of distributions of political power and wealth on the outcome are examined. There exist papers
that examine related issues, but this paper studies aspects unexplored by them, as detailed below.
Similar to this work, Acemoglu (2005) examines how economic performance is related to the gov-
ernment’s ability to tax and provide public services and finds that both strong and weak governments
result in low output. Based on the model populated by citizens and a selfish ruler who determines
policies to maximize rents (tax revenue minus expenditure on public services),8 effects of two kinds of
exogenous governmental abilities, economic (the ability to keep citizens from evading taxation) and
political (the ability to avoid replacement by citizens), are analyzed. He is particularly interested
in the political ability and thus dynamic interplay between rulers and citizens, hence, for simplicity,
many elements of the model are reduced-form and analyses are limited to steady states. This pa-
per, by contrast, is interested in interactions with human capital accumulation and modernization,
thus it constructs a more structural model and analyzes dynamics, but does not model transitions of
government and thus does not examine effects of the political ability.9
Acemoglu (2008) constructs a model where individuals with high or low entrepreneurial skill be-
come entrepreneurs or workers and the government chooses redistributive taxation and the fixed cost
to start a business incurred by new entrepreneurs. He examines trade-off between oligarchy (rule by
incumbent entrepreneurs) and democracy (rule by workers) and is particularly interested in dynamic
inefficiency of the entry barrier due to time-varying entrepreneurial skill. The present paper compares
rule by the educated and rule by the uneducated in a model where individuals with homogeneous
innate ability but heterogeneous wealth decide on educational investment and the government chooses
the amount of productive service as well as redistributive taxation. Both papers examine effects of
the distribution of political power on investment and sectoral allocations of individuals, but the Ace-
moglu’s focus is on the misallocation of ability, while this paper is interested in how the effects change
with development and how they interact with the distribution of wealth.
Besley and Persson (2009) consider a two-period economy in which the government invests in legal
capacity that contributes to the private sector’s output and fiscal capacity that raises the ability to tax,
provides public goods, may redistribute incomes, and determines income tax rates. The government
is controlled by one of two groups of individuals and can treat the groups differentially in policies, and
8He finds that the tax rate preferred by the ruler (citizens) is higher (lower) than the optimal rate, which is similar to
the this paper’s result that the rate preferred by the educated (the uneducated) is higher (lower) than the optimal rate.
9The economic ability of the government is endogenous in the sense that the propensity of unskilled workers to escape
for sector T with higher tax is related to the proportion of individuals accessible to education.
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the transition of power can occur exogenously between the periods. They examine what lead to good
provision of the state capacities and show that it is related to the presence of public goods highly
valued by both groups, as well as political stability and more representative political institutions.
They model government in greater detail than the present paper and Acemogul’s papers and focus on
interactions among different governmental functions, while this paper is interested in interactions of
government with human capital accumulation and modernization. Further, this paper is interested in
sectoral allocations of individuals and examines issues related to hiring of educated officials.
The second contribution is that the paper shows that the oversized traditional sector at an early
stage and overeducation at a late stage of development and the inefficient level of the public service
(when the tax rate is endogenous) all arise naturally from two realistic features of the model – the
exclusive access of skilled workers to governmental positions and, except for overeducation, the absence
of taxation in sector T – and that appropriate redistribution can correct these inefficiencies except at
a fairly early stage. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) examine the dynamics of education, inequality,
and development in a model where education has positive externality and the educated have political
power to choose redistribution to the poor. (They may implement costly redistribution because of
the externality.) Redistribution raises efficiency since, as in this paper, it enables credit constrained
individuals to access education, but it does not have the above-mentioned roles.
Third, it shows that the desirable distribution of political power changes with development and
is affected by factors such as the availability of a redistributive policy and the productivity of sector
T relative to the education cost. The educated should have decisive power at an early stage of
development mainly because the size of the public service is more efficient, while the uneducated should
have power at a late stage primarily because inequality is lower, structural change is promoted through
education of the poor, and, when redistribution is possible, overeducation can be prevented. If rule
by the uneducated is interpreted as democracy, one of the implications is consistent with the finding
by Baum and Lake (2003) that, in non-poor countries, democracy raises economic growth through
increased enrollment rates of secondary education, and the one by Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008),
who perform meta-regression analysis on existing 84 studies on the democracy-growth relationship,
that democracy increases growth through human capital accumulation.
Aside from papers cited earlier, this paper is related to the literature that examines the relationship
between skill and task specialization and growth. The seminal work by Becker and Murphy (1992)
emphasizes the dependence of specialization on the coordination cost and knowledge, and investigates
its implications for economic growth and industrial organization. In particular, they examine interac-
tions among knowledge accumulation, specialization, and growth using a one-sector growth model, and
explore the division of labor between the consumption good sector and the human capital production
sector in a two-sector growth model. This paper is indebted to their work in modeling specialization
among skilled workers engaged in the production of the intermediate product. However, distinct from
theirs, the paper distinguishes the sector that has productivity gains from specialization (sector M)
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from the sector without gains (sector T), models development as the shift from the latter sector to
the former, and examines the role of the cost-reducing public service in development.
Other works in the literature that draw on Becker and Murphy include Tamura (1996), Davis
(2003), and Yuki (2006), of which closely related are Davis (2003) and Yuki (2006). In order to
explain the increasing importance of governmental activities in advanced nations over the past century,
Davis (2003) extends the one-sector growth model of Becker and Murphy so that the coordination
cost depends on governmental expenditures, similarly to the present paper. However, it does not
consider roles of the sectoral shift, the credit constraint, and the distribution of political power in
development. Yuki (2006) examines the interplay among the extent of market (the size of population),
task specialization, and development, employing a model similar to the present paper, but considers
neither the role of government nor the effect of the distribution of political power.
The modeling of the educational decision and intergenerational transmission of wealth draws on
the literature that examines the interplay between income distribution and growth through human
capital accumulation, including Galor and Zeira (1993), Ljungqvist (1993), Benabou (1996), and Yuki
(2007, 2008). Closely related are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Yuki (2007, 2008), in which, as in this
paper, the educational investment is constrained by intergenerational transfers motivated by impure
altruism. Neither papers do not consider issues analyzed here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static part of the model, and Section
3 integrates the static part into the dynamic part and derives critical conditions for examining the
dynamics. Section 4 analyzes the model and derives results, and Section 5 concludes. Proofs of lemmas
and propositions except Lemma 9 and Proposition 6, which are straightforward, are in Appendix.
2 Static model
This section presents the static part of the model, that is, production decisions of firms and workers
and the determination of output and wages given the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers (all
variables are presented without time subscript). The full-fledged model is presented in the next section.
2.1 Final good production
There exist up to two private sectors, T (traditional) and M (modern), both producing the same final
good. Sector T hires unskilled workers and sector M hires both skilled and unskilled workers. In real
economy, sector T corresponds to sectors such as traditional or subsistence agriculture and the urban
informal sector, and sector M corresponds to sectors such as modern manufacturing and agriculture.
The production function of a representative firm of sector T is given by
YT = ATNLT , (1)
where YT is the output, AT is the productivity, and NLT is the number of unskilled workers of the
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sector. A representative final good producer of sector M has the following production function:
YM = AMNLMαIH1−α, (2)
where definitions of YM , AM , and NLM are same as corresponding symbols of sector T, and IH is the
input of the intermediate product produced by skilled workers, the determination of which is explained
below. Final good producers of both sectors behave competitively in goods and factors markets.
2.2 Intermediate product
The production technology of the intermediate product is the one employed by Becker and Murphy
(1992) for their final good. The intermediate product is produced with inputs of a continuum (measure
1) of different kinds of tasks using the Leontief technology:
YH = min 0≤s≤1
{
YH(s)
}
, (3)
where YH is the gross output of the intermediate product and YH(s) is the outcome of task s (0 ≤ s ≤ 1).
The specification implies that every task is equally essential in the production of YH , which tries
to capture the fact that, in modern sectors, many different tasks, each of which is difficult to be
substituted for others, must be combined to yield final output.
The outcome of task s is, in turn, a linear function of the effective labor of skilled workers engaged
in the task:
YH(s) =
∫
hi(s)l iy(s)di, (4)
where l iy(s) is the time spent on the production activity of the task by skilled worker i and h
i(s) is
the amount of her task-specific human capital, which is developed with her time input, l ih(s):
hi(s) = γ
[
l ih(s)
]θ
, θ > 0. (5)
The specification reflects the fact that tasks performed by skilled workers require highly specialized
skills and thus substantial time needs to be spent to build up such skills. Task-specific skill produc-
tion is not modeled for unskilled workers, because, in real economy, unskilled jobs require much less
investment in specific skills to perform their tasks satisfactorily.10
Let l i(s) be the total time spent on the task by the worker. She allocates the time between the
development of the specific skill and the production activity to maximize the outcome:
max{l iy(s),l ih(s)} h
i(s)l iy(s) = γ
[
l ih(s)
]θ
l iy(s), s.t. l
i
y(s) + l
i
h(s) = l
i(s). (6)
10Tan and Batra (1996) find that the incidence of formal training is positively associated with mean education and
the proportion of skilled workers in an enterprise’s workforce in Columbia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Taiwan.
Further, they find that formal training of skilled workers has a positive and significant impact on firm-level productivity,
while the effect of training of unskilled workers is statistically insignificant. Asplund (2005) notes that, in European
countries, the incidence of company-provided training is considerably lower in low-skill/low-pay industries, even after
controlling for a large set of personal and employer characteristics.
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From the maximization problem, the outcome equals
hi(s)l iy(s) = Γ[l
i(s)]1+θ, where Γ ≡ γθθ
(1+θ)1+θ
. (7)
Notice that the outcome exhibits increasing returns to the total time spent on the task. This is because
the return to invest in task-specific skill increases with the time spent on the production activity, as
is identified by Becker (1981) and Rosen (1983).
2.3 Coordination cost
The total output of the intermediate product is maximized when each task is performed by a single
worker. Because skilled workers are identical in terms of ability before receiving job trainings, the
maximum output would be attained when each skilled worker performs an equal measure of distinct
tasks. However, such outcome is not realized due to various costs of coordinating activities of workers
with distinct skills, such as the cost of processing information among specialized workers and the cost
of enforcing commands (if they belong to the same firm) or contracts (if they belong to different firms)
under information asymmetry and incompleteness.
Assume that these coordination problems result in the loss of the intermediate product and, fol-
lowing Becker and Murphy (1992), the total coordination cost associated with the problems depends
on the size of a production team, defined as a group of skilled workers with distinct specialization
that is just enough to produce the intermediate product. Unlike Becker and Murphy, however, the
government plays a role in reducing the coordination cost. The government imposes a value-added tax
on sector M and employs skilled workers to provide the cost-reducing service.11 Real-life examples of
the service include the maintenance of law and order, the establishment and enforcement of property
rights, contract law, and proper market regulations, and, when market incompleteness is severe, the
provision of credit and information stimulating market transactions. Note that unproductive public
services can be easily included into the model without affecting results qualitatively (see footnote 14
in the next subsection). Sector T is assumed to avoid taxation, reflecting the fact that small and often
unregistered enterprises and farmers in urban informal and rural sectors are difficult to be taxed in
developing economies (Burgess and Stern, 1993).
The coordination cost of a production team is given by
Ĉ = λS1+δ(N̂G)−ρ, (8)
where S is the size of the team, that is, the minimum number of skilled workers each of whom is
engaged in different tasks and, as a group, can produce the intermediate product, and N̂G is the
number of governmental skilled workers per team. Note that the coordination cost increases more
than proportionally with the team’s size, and the cost-reducing service is provided exclusively to the
team and does not spill over to other teams. Let NHM and NG be the total number of skilled workers
11It does not provide services that directly affect consumers’ utilities.
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in sector M and in the government, respectively. Because the number of production teams is NHMS ,
N̂G = NGNHM/S is satisfied and the cost function can be expressed as
Ĉ = λS1+δ−ρ
(
NG
NHM
)−ρ
. (9)
2.4 Degree of task specialization and output of sector M
Now the determination of S is considered. Each skilled worker has total time of 1 to allocate among
various tasks, i.e.
∫
l i(s)ds = 1. Because the total variety of tasks is measure 1, when the size of a
production team is S and workers are allocated to maximize the team’s output, each worker performs
1/S of the tasks and thus the total time spent on each task is S. Hence, from (4), (7), and (9), the
net output of the intermediate product produced by a team of size S is
ΓS1+θ − λS1+δ−ρ( NGNHM )−ρ. (10)
Skilled workers in sector M form teams (choose S) so that the net output per worker is maximized:12
S =
[
θΓ
λ(δ−ρ)
] 1
δ−ρ−θ ( NG
NHM
) ρ
δ−ρ−θ . (11)
It is assumed, for simplicity, that the market framework of the intermediate product subsector is such
that this allocation of skilled workers across tasks is realized in a decentralized manner.13
Since the number of teams is NHMS , the aggregate net output of the intermediate product is
IH = NHM
[
ΓSθ−λSδ−ρ( NGNHM )−ρ]. (12)
By substituting (12) into (2), the total output of the final good in sector M equals
YM = AM
[
ΓSθ−λSδ−ρ( NGNHM )−ρ]1−αNLMαNHM1−α. (13)
From (11), (13), and the CRS production function of sector T, the per capita output of the final good
depends on the sectoral distribution of workers, but not on the size of labor force, which is henceforce
normalized to be 1. Denote the proportions of sector i skilled workers, sector j unskilled workers, and
total skilled workers in the labor force by Hi (i=M,G), Lj (j =M,T ), and H, respectively, where
HM+HG=H and LM+LT =1−H.
The size of a production team is rewritten as
12To be more accurate, S = NHM , if the right-hand side of (11) is greater than NHM . From equations such as (23)
below, it can be shown that this happens if the number of skilled workers is very small or the tax rate is very high.
Because the situation where every skilled worker is engaged in distinct tasks is empirically unlikely, it is assumed that
the population size is large enough that this situation is negligible. Further, as will be shown in Lemma 2 of Section 3.2,
when the tax rate is very high, nobody becomes a skilled worker and thus this situation does not arise in an equilibrium
(under appropriate assumptions on values of parameters and exogenous variables). See footnote 15 also.
13For example, suppose that each production team is a firm that produces the intermediate product and sells it to final
good producers in sector M. It hires skilled workers and allocates them across tasks so as to maximize profits. Then,
from profit-maximizing and free entry conditions, the number of hired skilled workers, S, is given by (11).
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S =
[
θΓ
λ(δ−ρ)
] 1
δ−ρ−θ ( HG
HM
) ρ
δ−ρ−θ . (14)
Remember that S is also the total time that a skilled worker spends on each of her tasks. Thus,
hereafter S is called the degree of (task) specialization, which increases with HGHM . By substituting (14),
NHM =HM , and NG=HG into (12) and dividing the resulting expression by H, the net output of the
intermediate product per skilled worker is14
Ω
(
HG
H
) ≡ Ω0(HGH ) ρθδ−ρ−θ (1−HGH )1− ρθδ−ρ−θ , (15)
where Ω0 ≡
{
Γδ−ρ
[
θ
λ(δ−ρ)
]θ} 1
δ−ρ−θ
(
1− θδ−ρ
)
. (16)
Then, IH and YM are conveniently expressed as:
IH = Ω
(
HG
H
)
H, (17)
YM = AMLMα
[
Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
]1−α
. (18)
2.5 Wages
The government imposes a proportional tax of rate τ ∈ [0, 1] on the value added generated in sector
M. When the sector is in operation, from (18), the unskilled wage equals
wl = (1−τ)αAM
[
Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
LM
]1−α
. (19)
The remaining after-tax income goes to skilled workers, hence the skilled wage equals
wh =
(1−τ)(1−α)
H−HG AMLM
α
[
Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
]1−α
. (20)
From (1), wl = AT when LT > 0, which is true iff the RHS of (19) at LM = 1−H is less than AT , i.e.
H <
{
1+
[ (1−τ)αAM
AT
] 1
1−αΩ
(
HG
H
)}−1
. (21)
When wl = AT , the skilled wage (if sector M is in operation) becomes
wh = (1−α)AM
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−α (1−τ) 11−αΩ(HGH ) HH−HG. (22)
The wages can be expressed as functions of the tax rate. Since the governmental budget constraint
is whHG = τYM , from (18) and (20),
HG
H
=
τ
1− α(1− τ) . (23)
From the above equation, (15), and (22), the skilled wage when LT > 0 is
wh = (1−α)AMΩ0
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−α (1−τ) 11−α
[
τ
(1−α)(1−τ)
] ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
. (24)
14Unproductive public services can be included into the model without affecting qualitative results. Suppose that only
a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of governmental officers are engaged in the productive service. Then, the model is same as before
except that Ω
`
HG
H
´
is replaced by φ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θΩ
`
HG
H
´
. (The first HG
H
of eq. 15 is now φHG
H
from eqs. 12 and 14.)
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Similarly, the skilled and unskilled wages when LT = 0 (and thus LM = 1−H) are
wh = AMΩ01−α[1−α(1−τ)]
(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α(
1−H
H
)α
. (25)
wl = AMΩ01−αα(1−τ)
(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α(
H
1−H
)1−α
, (26)
where ρθδ−ρ−θ < 1 is assumed.
15 The next lemma summarizes relations between the wages and τ .
Lemma 1 (i) When LT = 0, there exists a single τ satisfying ∂wl∂τ = 0, τl, and
∂wl
∂τ ≷ 0 for τ ≶ τl.
Similar statements hold for wh when LT > 0 and wh when LT = 0 as well.
(ii) Let τ satisfying ∂wh∂τ = 0 when LT > 0 be τh and when LT = 0 be τh, respectively. Then,
τh > τh =
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ > τl.
3 Dynamics
This section integrates the production decisions presented in the previous section into the dynamic
part of the model. Consider a discrete-time small open OLG economy. In the economy, there exists
a continuum of individuals who are homogeneous in terms of innate abilities and preferences and live
for two periods. There is no uncertainty in the model.
3.1 Lifetime of an individual
Childhood: In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent and spends it on two
investment options, assets (which yields interest rate r) and education (which costs e but enables
her to become a skilled worker in adulthood), in order to maximize future income. The educational
investment must be self-financed because loan markets for such investment are not available. Consider
an individual born into lineage i in period t−1 (generation t) who receives bit units of transfer and can
allocate it between asset ait and education e
i
t. If the return from education is strictly higher than the
one from assets, the allocation is determined by bit:
ait = b
i
t, e
i
t = 0, if b
i
t < e, (27)
ait = b
i
t − e, eit = e, if bit ≥ et. (28)
Adulthood: At the beginning of adulthood, an individual makes an occupational choice based on
the educational investment. Then, she obtains income from assets and labor supply and spends it on
consumption cit and a transfer to her single child b
i
t+1. Her utility maximization problem is:
max{cit,bit+1} u
i
t =
(
cit
)1−γb(bit+1)γb , s.t. cit + bit+1 = wit + (1 + r)ait, (29)
15 For S to be always given by (14), (1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ < 1 must be assumed: if
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ ≥ 1, wh when LT > 0 increases with
τ as long as S is given by (14) (see equation 24), and thus it is maximized when τ is high enough that S = NHM holds
(see footnote 12), which means that, when τ is very high, S = NHM can be an equilibrium. The stronger assumption
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ < 1 is imposed so that wh when LT = 0 does not increase with τ monotonically.
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where wit is her wage and γb ∈ (0, 1). By solving the problem, her consumption and transfer equal
cit = (1− γb){wit + (1 + r)ait}, (30)
bit+1 = γb{wit + (1 + r)ait}. (31)
Generational change: At the beginning of period t+1, current adults pass away, current children
become adults, and new children are born into the economy. Since each adult has one child, the
population of each generation is time-invariant and normalized to be one.
3.2 Determination of sectoral and skill distributions of workers
Since individuals must self-finance the education cost, only those who received transfers greater than e
can access education. Let the fraction of such individuals in generation t (born in period t−1) be Frt .
Further, for them to actually take education, education must be profitable, i.e. wh,t − (1 + r)e ≥ wl,t
must hold. The following assumption is imposed to ensure that it is profitable when the unskilled
wage is lowest (equals AT ) and the skilled wage is highest (at τ = τh from Lemma 1).
Assumption 1 (1−α)1− ρθδ−ρ−θAM
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−αΩ0(1−τh)
1
1−α
[
τh
1−τh
] ρθ
δ−ρ−θ >AT+(1+r)e.
The next lemma shows that, when the tax rate is very high or very low, nobody takes education
and becomes a skilled worker and thus sector M is not in operation. Since all results in this subsection
are quasi-static (variables of different generations do not coexist in equations), variables are presented
without time subscript for simplicity.
Lemma 2 There exist τ s0 and τ
b
0 satisfying τ
s
0 < τh < τ
b
0 ,
16 such that, for τ < τ s0 and τ > τ
b
0 , H = 0
and thus sector M is not in operation.
A change in the tax rate has three effects on the skilled wage, which is expressed as wh = (1−
τ)(1−α)AM
(
LM
HM
)α[Ω(HGH ) HHM ]1−α from (20): the direct taxation effect, the productivity effect, and the
worker ratio effect. Through the direct taxation effect, higher τ lowers wh. The productivity effect
works through a change in the productivity of sector M, Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
HM
. Higher τ raises HGH (equation
23) and thus the amount of available governmental service, which reduces the coordination cost and
raises the degree of task specialization S (eq. 14). Higher S in turn raises the sector’s productivity
and thus wh. In aggregate, through the two effects, higher τ has a positive (negative) influence on wh
when τ < (>) τh. Finally, the worker ratio effect operates through a change in LMHM : if higher τ raises
(lowers) LMHM , it acts on wh positively (negatively).
When LT > 0, the sign of the worker ratio effect is same as the total impact of the first two
effects,17 hence, a tax increase raises (lowers) the skilled wage for τ < (>) τh (Lemma 1). Lemma 2
16Superscripts s and b are for ’small’ and ’big’, respectively. The superscripts will be used for other variables for the
same meanings.
17The worker ratio effect depends on the total impact of the first two effects on the unskilled wage, which is qualitatively
same as the impact on wh: when τ < (>) τh, higher τ has a positive (negative) effect on the sector M’s unskilled wage
through the two effects, thus LM
HM
must rise (fall) to keep the wage constant at wl = AT (sector T cannot be taxed).
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shows that, when τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 , the wage is lowered to the point that education is unprofitable
and all individuals work in sector T.18
The rest of the subsection examines sectoral and skill distributions of workers when the tax rate
is in the intermediate range, i.e. τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ]. As long as LT > 0 is satisfied, from (24) and Lemma
2, wh − (1+r)e ≥ wl = AT holds for any H, so all individuals who can afford education take it and
become skilled workers, i.e. H = Fr . Since LT > 0 is satisfied iff wl < AT holds with LT = 0, from
(21), (15), (23), and H = Fr , the dividing line between the case LT > 0 and the case LT = 0 is:
Fr =H(τ) ≡
{
1 +
[ (1−τ)αAM
AT
] 1
1−αΩ0
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
}−1
. (32)
When Fr <H(τ), LT > 0, where wl = AT and thus wh is independent of H = Fr (see eq. 24), and
when Fr ≥H(τ), LT = 0. The next lemma examines the relation between Fr and τ satisfying (32),
that is, the shape of the dividing line on the (Fr , τ) plane (see Figure 1 below).
Lemma 3 On the (Fr, τ) plane, the dividing line between LT > 0 and LT = 0,Fr =H(τ), is defined
for τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ], positively sloped for τ > max{τl, τ s0 }, and, when τl > τ s0 , negatively sloped for τ < τl.
From its definition, the shape of the line reflects the three effects of taxation explained above on
the unskilled wage when LT = 0, which is expressed as wl = (1−τ)αAM
[
Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
HM
HM
LM
]1−α from (19).
As before, higher τ acts on wl negatively through the direct taxation effect and positively through
the productivity effect. By contrast, wl is always negatively affected through the worker ratio effect:
higher τ raises HGH and thus
LM
HM
= 1−HH−HG . When τ > τl, the productivity effect is dominated and
wl decreases with τ , while the opposite happens when τ < τl (Lemma 1 (i)) and thus the association
between τ andH(τ) is as stated in the lemma.19
When LT = 0, i.e. Fr ≥H(τ), the net return to education, wh − (1 + r)e− wl, decreases with Fr
and becomes negative when Fr is high enough. This is because, from (25) and (26), wh decreases and
wl increases with H = Fr , wh = +∞ and wl = 0 at Fr = 0, and wh = 0 and wl = +∞ at Fr = 1.
Thus, if wh − (1 + r)e < wl is satisfied with H = Fr , in an equilibrium, only some of those who can
access education take it and wh− (1+r)e = wl holds. The case in which wh− (1+r)e > wl holds with
H = Fr is called the unequal opportunity case, while the case in which wh − (1 + r)e ≤ wl is satisfied
with H = Fr (and thus H ≤ Fr in an equilibrium) is called the equal opportunity case.20 From (25)
and (26), the dividing line between the two cases is
18The argument is concerned only with the case LT > 0, because LT = 0 is not possible for τ < τ
s
0 and τ > τ
b
0 : given
τ , whenever wh − (1 + r)e < wl holds with LT > 0, it does with LT = 0.
19 Qualitatively, effects of taxation on the size of LT (when LT > 0) are same as those on H(τ) (and opposite to
effects on wl when LT = 0), which is clear from the fact that LT is obtained by equating (26) (with 1 −H replaced by
1−H −LT ) with AT . Thus, the size of sector T is affected positively by the direct taxation effect and negatively by the
productivity effect. Consistent with this, Friedman et al. (2000) find more over-regulation and greater corruption, both
of which lower the productivity effect (see footnote 14), are associated with a greater unofficial economy.
20The name of the former case is from the fact that the rate of return from education exceeds the interest rate and
access to such profitable investment opportunity is constrained by received transfers.
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Figure 1: Positions of the critical loci when τl > τ s0 and τeo < τ
b
0
AMΩ01−α
(
1−Fr
Fr
)α( τ ρθδ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1− ρθδ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α(
1− α(1−τ)1−Fr
)
= (1+r)e. (33)
When τ ∈ (0, 1), the LHS of the equation decreases with Fr , equals +∞ at Fr = 0, and equals −∞
at Fr = 1, thus, for any τ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a single Fr satisfying (33). Denote the dividing line by
Fr = H∗(τ). The next lemma presents the relation between Fr and τ satisfying the equation.
Lemma 4 On the (Fr, τ) plane, the dividing line between the unequal and equal opportunity cases,
Fr = H∗(τ), is defined for τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ], positively sloped for τ < min{τeo, τ b0 }, where τeo > τh, and,
when τeo < τ b0 , negatively sloped for τ > τeo. Further, it intersects with Fr =H(τ) at τ = τ
s
0 , τ
b
0 .
The shape of the dividing line reflects effects of taxation on wh − wl when LT = 0, which is
expressed as wh − wl = (1−τ)AM
[
Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
HM
]1−α[(1−α)( LMHM )α−α(HMLM )1−α]. A change in the tax
rate acts on both wages equi-proportionately through the negative direct taxation effect and the
positive productivity effect, while, through the worker ratio effect, it affects wh positively and wl
negatively. Thus, higher τ has a positive impact on wh − wl through the productivity and worker
ratio effects and a negative impact through the direct taxation effect. Because the former two effects
dominate when τ is low, together with the fact the wage differential decreases with Fr , the shape of
the dividing line is as stated in the lemma.
Figure 1 illustrates positions of the critical loci, τ = τ s0 , τ = τ
b
0 , Fr =H(τ), and Fr = H
∗(τ) on
the (Fr , τ) plane, when τl > τ s0 and τeo < τ
b
0 are satisfied. Remember that H = 0 for τ < τ
s
0 and
τ > τ b0 ; LT > (=)0 for Fr < (≥)H(τ); and H = Fr for Fr < H∗(τ), while H = H∗(τ) for Fr ≥ H∗(τ).
The lemmas show how sectoral and skill distributions of workers are determined for each combina-
tion of Fr and τ . With the dynamics of Frt and τ t, the lemmas allow one to explore how the structure
of the economy changes over time. The next subsection examines the dynamics of transfers of each
lineage and thereby derives the dynamics of Frt for given τ .
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3.3 Dynamics of individual transfers and Frt
3.3.1 Dynamics of individual transfers
The dynamic equation linking the received transfer bit to the transfer given to the next generation b
i
t+1
is derived from the transfer rule (31). For a current unskilled worker, i.e. one who has received bit < e,
it is obtained by substituting wit = wl,t and a
i
t = b
i
t into (31):
b it+1 = bl(b
i
t;wl,t) ≡ γb{wl,t + (1 + r)bit}. (34)
The assumption γb(1+ r) < 1 is made so that the fixed point of the equation for given wl,t, b∗l (wl,t) ≡
γb
1−γb(1+r)wl,t, exists. The fixed point becomes crucial in later analyses.
For a present skilled worker, i.e. one who has received bit ≥ e, the dynamic equation is
b it+1 = bh(b
i
t;wh,t) ≡ γb{wh,t + (1 + r)(bit − e)}, (35)
which is obtained by substituting wit = wh,t and a
i
t = b
i
t− e into (31). The fixed point for given wh,t is
b∗h(wh,t) ≡ γb1−γb(1+r) [wh,t− (1+ r)e]. In the equal opportunity case, i.e. Frt ≥ H
∗(τ), wh,t− (1+ r)e =
wl,t holds, so the two equations coincide, and when the educational investment is not profitable, i.e.
τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 , all individual dynamics follow (34) with wl,t = AT .
The two dynamic equations show that, when τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ], the dynamics of transfers within a lineage
depend on the time evolution of wage levels and thus the proportion of skilled workers Ht (and τ).
Since Ht = Frt for Frt < H∗(τ) and Ht = H∗(τ) for Frt ≥ H∗(τ), the individual dynamics are
ultimately dependent on the dynamics of Frt .
3.3.2 Dynamics of Frt
The dynamics of Frt (the proportion of individuals who can afford education) are in turn determined
by the dynamics of individual transfers. Thus, the individual and aggregate dynamics are interrelated.
In the unequal opportunity case, i.e. Frt < H∗(τ), if children of some of unskilled workers become
accessible to education through wealth accumulation, Frt would increase over time, while, if a portion
of skilled workers cannot leave transfers to cover the cost of education, Frt would decrease. The former
occurs iff there exist lineages satisfying bit < e and b
i
t+1 ≥ e. From (34), the following condition must
be satisfied for such lineages to exist:
b∗l (wl,t) ≡ γb1−γb(1+r)wl,t > e. (36)
By contrast, the latter case occurs iff lineages satisfying bit ≥ e and bit+1 < e exist. From (35), the
necessary condition is
b∗h(wh,t) ≡ γb1−γb(1+r){wh,t − (1 + r)e} < e. (37)
Since b∗h(wh,t) ≥ b∗l (wl,t) is satisfied, the above equations do not hold simultaneously. If (36) is satisfied,
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Frt+1 ≥ Frt , while if (37) holds, Frt+1 ≤ Frt . Note that Frt+1 = Frt is possible depending on the
distribution of transfers. However, if the condition continues to hold, Frt does change at some point.
When neither equations are satisfied, Frt+1 = Frt .
In the equal opportunity case (Frt ≥ H∗(τ)), the dynamics of Frt are determined by the relative
value of b∗l (wl,t) = b
∗
h(wh,t) to e, and when the educational investment is unprofitable (τ < τ
s
0 or
τ > τ b0 ), the dynamics depend on the relative value of b
∗
l (wl,t) =
γb
1−γb(1+r)AT to e.
4 Analysis
This section examines how the structure of the economy changes over time from a given initial dis-
tribution of wealth (transfers). Since the dynamics of Frt differ greatly depending on the value of
γb
1−γb(1+r)AT (b
∗
l (wl,t) when wl,t = AT ) relative to e, the section is divided into two subsections based
on the relative value. In each subsection, initially the dynamics are examined for given τ , then τ is
endogenized, and finally the case in which income redistribution too is a policy option is examined.
4.1 When γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e
This is the case in which the productivity of sector T is high enough (relative to the education cost)
that, even when the unskilled wage is lowest, descendants of unskilled workers gain access to education
eventually. Hence, from any initial distribution of wealth, Frt increases over time.
4.1.1 Exogenous tax rate
The next proposition presents the dynamics of the economic structure when the tax rate is fixed.
Proposition 1 Suppose γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e and τ is fixed.
(i) (Dynamics of Frt) Frt increases over time and Frt = 1 is satisfied in the long run.
(ii) (Dynamics of sectoral and skill distributions of workers) Given τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ], (a) when LT,t > 0,
Ht = Frt , HM,t, HG,t, and LM,t all increase proportionally, while LT,t decreases over time; (b)
when LT,t = 0 and Frt < H∗(τ), Ht = Frt , HM,t, and HG,t increase and LM,t = Lt = 1−Frt
decreases over time; and (c) when Frt ≥ H∗(τ), Ht = H∗(τ) and the sectoral allocation of
workers is time-invariant. When τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 , Ht = 0 and LT,t = 1.
(iii) (Wage dynamics) Given τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ), (a) when LT,t > 0, both wages are constant; (b) when
LT,t = 0 and Frt < H∗(τ), wl,t increases and wh,t decreases over time; and (c) when Frt ≥
H∗(τ), the wages are constant and wh,t − (1 + r)e = wl,t. When τ ≤ τ s0 or τ ≥ τ b0 , wl,t = AT
(= wh,t − (1 + r)e when τ = τ s0 , τ b0 ).
The dynamics of Frt and other aspects of the economic structure can be grasped readily by employ-
ing a phase diagram. Figure 2 presents the dynamics when τl > τ s0 and τeo < τ
b
0 ,
21 which is obtained
21Remember that τl is defined as the tax rate maximizing wl when LT = 0 and τeo as the tax rate at the inflection
point of Fr = H∗(τ). All the results in the proposition and the explanation that follows apply irrespective of the value
of τl relative to τ
s
0 and that of τeo relative to τ
b
0 .
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Figure 2: The dynamics when ATe is high and τ is fixed
by superimposing the dynamics of Frt and positions of τh and τh on Figure 1. In the figure, H = 0
for τ < τ s0 and τ > τ
b
0 ; LT > 0 for Fr <H(τ) and LT = 0 for Fr ≥H(τ); and the economy belongs to
the unequal opportunity case and H = Fr for Fr < H∗(τ), whereas it satisfies equal opportunity and
H = H∗(τ) for Fr ≥ H∗(τ). Directions of motion of Fr are represented with horizontal arrows.
The figure shows that, irrespective of the initial distribution of wealth (thus Fr0 ) and τ , Frt
increases over time and Fr = 1 holds in the long run. However, the tax rate makes significant
differences in the dynamics and the long-run state of other aspects of the economy. When the tax rate
is very low or very high, i.e. τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 , the educational investment is not rewarding for any Fr ,
everyone becomes an unskilled worker, and thus only sector T is in operation, as shown in Lemma
2.22 As explained in detail after the lemma, when the tax rate is too low, the productivity of sector M
is low because task specialization among skilled workers is limited due to a lack of the governmental
service that helps reducing the coordination cost. Further, as a result of the low productivity, many
unskilled workers, who are complementary to skilled workers in sector M, choose sector T rather than
sector M. Hence, the skilled wage is low and the educational investment is unprofitable. By contrast,
when the tax rate is too high, what depresses the skilled wage and makes education unrewarding is
the tax burden that more than offsets the resultant high degree of specialization and induces many
unskilled workers to choose sector T for tax avoidance.
If the tax rate is not extreme, the economy goes through the following path of the structural change
when it starts with Fr0 <H(τ). While Frt <H(τ) is satisfied, unskilled workers are abundant and
some of them have to take jobs in sector T. As more individuals gain access to education over time,
the proportion of skilled workers increases and production and employment shift to sector M. Tax
revenue increases with the growth of sector M and the government too expands. Note that unskilled
22 From the equation of Assumption 1, an increase in AT lowers τ
b
0 and raises τ
s
0 . That is, H = 0 is more likely to
occur with ’bad’ tax policies when the productivity of the traditional sector is higher.
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workers too move to sector M (with the skilled-unskilled labor ratio of the sector unchanged), because
higher numbers of skilled workers in the sector and in the government have, given other things equal,
positive effects on the supply of the intermediate product and thus the sector’s productivity. As long
as LT,t > 0, both wages remain unchanged because the unskilled wage is fixed by the productivity of
sector T and the (total factor) productivity of sector M is unchanged.23
Once sector M becomes large enough to absorb all unskilled workers, the dynamics change. Because
the wages are now independent of AT (and
HG,t
Ht
is constant), the wages are determined by the ratio
of total unskilled to skilled workers (see eqs. 25 and 26). Hence, as more individuals become skilled
workers, the unskilled wage rises, while the skilled wage and wage inequality fall. The rising unskilled
wage stimulates wealth accumulation of unskilled workers and the growth of Frt and Ht. The sectoral
shift, the skill upgrading, and the associated changes in the wages end when the economy reaches the
state of equal opportunity where both wages (net of the education cost) are equal.
When τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ), wages change with the growth of H for Fr ∈ (H(τ),H∗(τ)). How does net
aggregate labor income [wh−(1+r)e]H+wl(1−H), a measure of aggregate (private) consumption for
given aggregate assets (see eq. 30), change with H?24 The next proposition shows that it increases and
then decreases with H. That is, overeducation is inevitable in the long run. Further, the proposition
shows that, when attention is limited to steady states, there is a range of tax rates where overeducation
occurs in the sense that H is higher but net aggregate labor income is lower than at the tax rate
maximizing it. In the proposition, net aggregate labor income is denoted as Y˜L.
Proposition 2 Suppose τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ).
(i) For given τ , there exists unique H ∈ [H(τ),H∗(τ)) maximizing net aggregate labor income,
denoted H¦(τ), and ∂ eYL∂H < (>)0 for H > (<)H¦(τ). That is, overeducation is inevitable in the
long run when γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e.
(ii) In the equal opportunity case, net labor income (thus private consumption) is maximized at
τ = τh < min{τeo, τ b0 } and ∂ eYL∂τ > (<)0 for τ < (>) τh, while H = H∗(τ) is maximized at
τ = min{τeo, τ b0 } and ∂H
∗(τ)
∂τ > (<)0 for τ < (>)min{τeo, τ b0 }. That is, when γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e,
among steady states with different τ , overeducation occurs in a range of τ .
The first type of overeducation arises because only educated individuals benefit directly from
employment opportunities at the government and thus the private return to education is higher than
the social return.25 The overeducation occurs only at a late stage of development since the social return
is positive while not many can access education. The second type of overeducation is represented in
23Given the tax rate, the amount of the governmental service per production team does not change with Ht, hence
the degree of task specialization and the total factor productivity remain constant (see equations 9, 14, 15, 18, and 23).
24Note that net aggregate labor income does not equal GDP net of the education cost: it equals YT + YM − (1 + r)eH
from whHG = τYM , while GDP equals net aggregate labor income plus the indirect tax revenue τYM . However, since
utility does not depend on the government consumption directly, it is a better measure of aggregate welfare.
25Since total labor income when LT = 0 equals YM , from (18), the social return is
∂YM
∂H
− (1 + r)e − ∂YM
∂LM
, while
wl = (1− τ) ∂YM∂LM from (19) and wh =
1−α(1−τ)
1−α
∂YM
∂H
from (20) and (23).
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Figure 2: the tax rate maximizing H∗(τ), τeo, is higher than the net wage-maximizing rate, τh, thus
there is a range of τ at which H∗(τ) is higher than at τh. This overeducation arises because the return
to taxation is higher for skilled workers.26
The fact that only the educated benefit directly from governmental positions, together with the
absence of taxation in sector T, also leads to the oversized traditional sector at an early stage of
development: the unskilled wage of sector M is lower than the marginal productivity of unskilled
workers, i.e. wl = (1 − τ) ∂YM∂LM (footnote 25), thus too many unskilled workers choose sector T when
LT > 0, andH(τ) is too high.
4.1.2 Endogenous tax rate
Now the determination of the tax rate is modeled. Suppose that the tax rate is chosen by a politically
influential group so as to maximize their incomes in each period. Since the tax rate affects skilled
and unskilled wages differently and only educated individuals can access skilled jobs, educated and
uneducated individuals have different stakes in the tax policy.27 Thus, situations in which either of
the two groups have political power to determine the policy are examined.
As for the timing of the policy decision, two cases are considered. In the commitment case, the
tax rate that is optimal to them before education is completed is implemented in the next period. By
contrast, in the non-commitment case, the tax rate can be chosen after education is completed and
thus an ex-ante optimal rate may not be implemented. This paper mainly focuses on the commitment
case because one of the results of the non-commitment case (Proposition 5 (ii) in Section 4.1.3) is
not robust under a more realistic assumption that parents care about effects of their policies on their
descendants. The next lemma presents the equilibrium tax rate.
Lemma 5 (i) When educated individuals determine the tax rate, it equals τh for Fr ≤H(τh), τ
satisfying Fr =H(τ) for Fr ∈ [H(τh),H(min{τh, τ b0 })], and min{τh, τ b0 } for Fr ≥H(min{τh, τ b0 }).
In the commitment case, there exists Fr ∈ (H∗(τh), H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }))) above which it equals τh.
(ii) When the uneducated determine τ , any value can be an equilibrium rate for Fr ≤H(max{τl, τ s0 }).
For Fr >H(max{τl, τ s0 }), the rate equals max{τl, τ s0 }. In the commitment case, it equals τ
satisfying Fr = H∗(τ) for Fr ∈ [H∗(max{τl, τ s0 }),H∗(τh)] and is τh for higher Fr.
Based on the lemma, Figure 3 shows the dynamics of Frt and τ t when τl>τ s0 and τeo<τ
b
0 , the same
case as Figure 2.28 The heavy solid (dashed) line represents the dynamics when educated (uneducated)
individuals determine the tax policy, and the stars represent the long-run level of H for each case.
26wh is maximized at τ = τh, while wl is maximized at τ = τl < τh, and wi(i = h, l) decreases (increases) with τ for
τ > (<)τi [Lemma 1]. Since wh − wl decreases with H, τeo is the rate maximizing wh − wl at H = H∗(τeo) and thus
τeo > τh must hold. By contrast, τh is the rate maximizing wh (or wl) under the constraint wh − (1 + r)e = wl and thus
τh ∈ (τl, τh) must be true.
27Although all educated individuals take skilled jobs in an equilibrium, distinguishing them from skilled workers is
important. See the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix for details.
28All the results that follow hold qualitatively regardless of the value of τl relative to τ
s
0 and that of τeo relative to τ
b
0 .
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Figure 3: The dynamics when ATe is high and τ is endogenous
The dashed line is not presented for Fr ≤H(τl), since wl=AT for any τ and thus the uneducated is
indifferent on the tax rate. Whichever group decide on the tax rate, Frt increases and τ t non-decreases
over time (except when the educated choose the policy and commit to the ex-ante optimal rate, in
which case τ t declines from τh to τh at some point), thus the qualitative dynamics of the structure of
the economy are mostly as presented in Proposition 1.
The dynamics of the commitment case and of the non-commitment case are different when Fr is
very high. In the commitment case, the effect of τ on H is taken into account in choosing τ , thus
the chosen rate maximizes the wage of the group with decisive power. Hence, in the long run, both
groups choose τh, the rate maximizing net wage (thus private consumption) in the equal opportunity
case. (Remember, however, that H∗(τh) is greater than H maximizing net aggregate labor income
at τ = τh.) By contrast, in the non-commitment case, the tax rate can be changed after education
is completed and H is determined taking into account this, thus the wage-maximizing rate may not
be realized, which is the case when Fr is high. In particular, when the educated determine the tax
rate, those who can afford education cannot coordinate to select the optimal rate by restricting H
to H∗(τh) < Fr , because, after education is completed, the educated have incentives to deviate from
τh and choose τh for higher wage (and anticipating this, too many individuals take education). In
contrast, when the uneducated have power, the optimal rate cannot be an equilibrium, because after
H∗(τh) individuals take education, the uneducated have incentives to lower the tax rate for higher
wage, which results in a negative return to education.
The tax rate is higher when it is chosen by the educated, except at the last stage of the com-
mitment case, because the return to taxation is higher for them from employment opportunities at
the government. The question is how far the chosen rates are from the best rate in the competitive
economy and the socially optimal rate (in terms of efficiency).
The next proposition describes tax rates maximizing net aggregate labor income (thus aggregate
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private consumption) for given Fr in the competitive and the command economies, and shows that
the rate chosen by the educated (the uneducated) is higher (lower) than the best-optimal rate when
LT = 0 and wl > AT hold at the chosen rate (except at the last stage of the commitment case, which
is best in the competitive economy), while when LT > 0, the rate selected by educated individuals is
best in the competitive economy but is lower than the optimal rate (see Figure 3).
Proposition 3 (i) For given Fr, the tax rate maximizing net aggregate labor income Y˜L in the
competitive economy equals τh for Fr≤H(τh) and τ satisfying Fr=H(τ) for Fr ∈
[
H(τh),H(τy)
]
,
where τy ≡ (1−α)
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
∈ (τh,min{τh, τ b0 }). For Fr ≥H(τy), the rate is τy until some Fr ∈
(H∗(τh),H∗(τy)), above which it equals τh. The net income increases (decreases) with τ when τ
is lower (higher) than the rate maximizing it.
(ii) For given Fr, the tax rate maximizing Y˜L in the command economy equals τy.
(iii) When Fr ≤ H(τy), τ chosen by the educated is best in the competitive economy but is lower
than the optimal rate. When Fr >H(τy), the rate chosen by the educated (the uneducated) is
higher (lower) than the best and optimal rate, except in the commitment case, in which it is
best in the competitive economy (but is lower than the optimal rate) if Fr is greater than some
Fr ∈ (H∗(τh), H∗(τh)) (if Fr ≥ H∗(τh)).
When LT = 0 and wl > AT at the equilibrium tax rate, the educated overevaluate the contribution
of the governmental activity (thus taxation) on output and the uneducated underevaluate it. When
LT > 0, by contrast, the rate chosen by the educated is best in the competitive economy, because the
unskilled wage is fixed by the productivity of sector T, i.e. wl = AT , and thus maximizing the skilled
wage amounts to maximizing net aggregte labor income. However, the best rate in such case is lower
than the optimal rate τy, at which the ’efficiency’ of sector M, Ω
(
HG
H
)
, is maximized (see eq. 18). The
reason is that, in the competitive economy, unskilled workers in sector M are overtaxed and thus, to
keep them from escaping to sector T, the tax rate must be lower.
Results suggest that the socially desirable distribution of political power changes with development
(see the figure). While the unskilled wage is not affected by the tax policy, i.e. Fr ≤H(τl), educated
individuals should have decisive power, unless a very high priority is given to equity: when they
choose τ , net aggregate labor income is maximized in the competitive economy (although the wage
inequality too is maximized), whereas when the uneducated determine the policy and, plausibly, they
are concerned about the inequality too in choosing τ , there exists the non-negligible risk that τ ≥ τ b0
or τ ≤ τ s0 is chosen and Y˜L (and the inequality) is minimized. Otherwise, i.e. Fr >H(τl), it is difficult
to state the desirable distribution precisely, but what is clear is that the uneducated should have some
influence on the policy. The reason is that, when LT = 0, as their influence becomes stronger, the
unskilled wage increases, which leads to greater wealth accumulation of unskilled workers and thus
faster structural change. (Further, the tax rate maximizing Y˜L is between the rates preferred by the
two groups when Fr >H(τy).)
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4.1.3 When the redistributive policy is available
The preceding analysis shows that both groups cannot choose the tax rate and thus the size of public
service optimally, nor can they avoid overeducation at a late stage and oversized sector T at an early
stage of development. If redistribution is feasible, by contrast, these inefficiencies can be resolved.
Assume that the government can impose a proportional tax on wages generated in the modern and
the government sectors and use the revenue to provide a lump-sum transfer to workers with political
power in the sectors. The transfer to the educated may be interpreted as benefits and privileges asso-
ciated with pollical power. (When only non-targeted transfer is available, results when the educated
[the uneducated] have power are same as the original economy without [with] redistribution.) Denote
the skilled wage (20) and the unskilled wage (19) (with HGH replaced by equation 23) by wh(τ ,H,LM)
and wl(τ ,H,LM) respectively.
When educated individuals have decisive political power and can commit to policies that are
optimal for them before H is fixed, the chosen policies are solutions to the following problem.
max{x,T,τ} (1− x)wh(τ ,H,LM) + T (38)
s.t. (1− x)wh(τ ,H,LM) + T − (1 + r)e ≥ (1− x)wl(τ ,H,LM), (39)
(1− x)wl(τ ,H,LM) ≥ AT , (40)
x[wh(τ ,H,LM)H + wl(τ ,H,LM)LM ] = TH, (41)
H = Fr when (39) holds with such H; otherwise, (39) holds with =, (42)
LM = 1−H when (40) holds with such LM ; otherwise, (40) holds with =, (43)
where x ∈ [0, 1] is the wage tax rate and T is the lump-sum transfer. (39) is the incentive compatibility
constraint for the educated (the net return to education must be non-negative), (40) is the individual
rationality constraint for the unskilled, (41) is the governmental budget constraint for the redistributive
policy, and (42) and (43) determine H and LM , respectively. Note that feasibility conditions H ≤ Fr
and LM ≤ 1−H are reflected in (42) and (43). When they cannot commit to ex-ante optimal policies,
x, T , and τ are determined given H.
The next proposition summarizes the chosen policies, H, and LM . In the proposition, Hb(τ)
(τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 )) denotes the bigger H of two H ∈ (0, 1) at which net aggregate labor income Y˜L when
LT = 0 equals AT , whereHb(τ) > H∗(τ).
Proposition 4 Suppose that educated individuals determine τ and the redistributive policy.
(i) In the commitment case, τ coincides with the rate described in Proposition 3 (i).
(a) If Fr ≤H(τy), x = T = 0, H = Fr, and LM is determined so that wl(τ ,Fr ,LM) = AT .
(b) If Fr > H(τy), LM = 1 − H(LT = 0). There exists Fr ∈ (H∗(τh),H∗(τy)) such that
x, T = (>)0 for higher (lower) Fr, and when x, T > 0, unskilled workers receive AT ,
τ = τy, and H = Fr, while when x = T = 0, τ = τh, and H = H∗(τh).
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Figure 4: The dynamics when ATe is high and the educated determine τ and the redistributive policy
(ii) In the non-commitment case, the result is same as (i) if Fr ≤H(τy). If Fr >H(τy), x, T > 0,
unskilled workers receive AT , τ = τy, LM = 1−H, and H = Fr for Fr ≤Hb(τy)(> H∗(τy)) and
H =Hb(τy) otherwise.
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of Frt and τ t when τl>τ s0 and τeo<τ
b
0 (the stars represent the
long-run level of H for each case). As before, τ and H determine Y˜L completely.
In the commitment case, τ coincides with the rate of Proposition 3 (i) and thus is best in the
competitive economy without redistribution for any Fr . When wl = AT holds without redistribution
(Fr ≤H(τ)), the redistributive policy is not implemented (thus the outcome is same as the economy
without redistribution), since it induces unskilled workers to escape for sector T and lowers the skilled
wage. When wl > AT without redistribution, the policy is implemented unless Fr is very high, and the
wage-tax rate is chosen so that the unskilled become indifferent between the sectors (their after-tax
wage equals AT ). Then, the amount each skilled worker receives is (Y˜L−ATL)/H + (1+r)e, thus
maximizing their disposable income amounts to maximizing Y˜L and the socially optimal rate τy is
selected. When Fr is very large, however, the policy lowers the disposable income and thus is not
implemented. Since (Y˜L − ATL)/H decreases with H and the net skilled wage when H = H∗(τ) is
highest at τ = τh (Proposition 2), x = T = 0 and τ = τh are chosen and equal opportunity is realized
from some Fr ∈ (H∗(τh),H∗(τy)).29
By contrast, because the switch to x = T = 0 is not possible in the non-commitment case,
the redistributive policy and τ = τy continue to be enforced and Ht increases over time until equal
opportunity is realized at H = Hb(τy)(> H∗(τy)), where both groups end up receiving (net of the
education cost) AT . Thus, overeducation is exacerbated when redistribution is possible.
29Thus, inequality in non-capital income between skilled and unskilled workers decreases over time as before, although
the total pie for skilled workers, eYL − ATL + (1+r)eH, increases with H (see the proof of Proposition 4 (i)(b)). By
contrast, the after-tax unskilled wage remains AT until the last stage, when it jumps to eY .
24
The allocation realized in the commitment case is efficient while sector T does not exist and
overeducation is not the issue (not many can access education), but is not efficient when Fr is low,
where τ is too low (the public service is undersupplied for given H) and sector T is oversized, and
when Fr is very high, where τ is too low and H is too high (Propositions 2 (i) and 3 (i)(ii)). By
contrast, as shown below, efficient allocation is attained unless Fr is fairly low when the uneducated
have decisive power and commit to ex-ante optimal policies.
When they determine policies, the chosen policies in the commitment case are solutions to:
max{x,T,τ} {(1− x)wl(τ ,H,LM) + T} (44)
s.t. (1− x)wh(τ ,H,LM)− (1 + r)e ≥ (1− x)wl(τ ,H,LM) + T, (45)
(1− x)wl(τ ,H,LM) + T ≥ AT , (46)
x[wh(τ ,H,LM)H + wl(τ ,H,LM)LM ] = TLM , (47)
H = Fr when (45) holds with such H; otherwise, (45) holds with =, (48)
LM = 1−H when (46) holds with such LM ; otherwise, (46) holds with =, (49)
where (45) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the educated and (46) is the individual ratio-
nality constraint for the unskilled.
The following assumption is imposed to ensureH(τh) < H¦(τh), that is, highest Y˜L when wl = AT ,
which is at τ = τh, is lower than highest Y˜L when wl > AT (thus LT = 0) and τ = τh.
Assumption 2 (1−α)1− ρθδ−ρ−θAM
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−αΩ0(1−τh)
1
1−α
[
τh
1−τh
] ρθ
δ−ρ−θ > 1−α(1−τh)1−α
[
AT
1−τh+(1+r)e
]
.
Note that this assumption implies Assumption 1 and, together with Proposition 3 (i), impliesH(τy) <
H¦(τy). It is equivalent to the net social return to education when wl = AT and τ = τh being positive
in the competitive economy.30 The assumption is very weak since, it is very likely in real economy
that, as long as the best tax rate is selected, education is socially productive when sector T exists.
The next proposition summarizes the chosen policies, H, and LM . Hs(τ) (τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 )) denotes the
smaller H of two H ∈ (0, 1) at which Y˜L when LT = 0 equals AT , whereHs(τ) <H(τ).
Proposition 5 Suppose that uneducated individuals choose τ and the redistributive policy.
(i) In the commitment case,
(a) If Fr ≤ Hs(τy)(< H(τy)), even with the redistributive policy, they cannot receive more
than AT , thus they are indifferent among any policies that assure AT , including those with
x = T = 0 and τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 .
(b) If Fr > Hs(τy), the redistributive policy is implemented and the net return to education
becomes zero, τ = τy, and LM = 1 −H. When Fr ∈ (Hs(τy),H¦(τy)], H = Fr, and when
Fr > H¦(τy)(∈ (H(τy),H∗(τy))), H = H¦(τy).
(ii) In the non-commitment case, H = LM = 0 and wl = AT .
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Figure 5: The dynamics when ATe is high and the uneducated determine τ and the redistributive
policy (the commitment case)
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of Frt and τ t in the commitment case when τl>τ s0 and τeo<τ
b
0 .
31
If the tax base of the redistributive policy, total labor income in the non-traditional sectors, does not
exceed AT + (1+r)eH even when all unskilled workers are allocated to sector M, i.e. Fr ≤Hs(τ),
unskilled workers cannot obtain more than AT with redistribution (since the net return to education
must be non-negative), thus they are indifferent among any policies that assure AT (thus, any dashed
line is not presented in the figure), including ones with x = T = 0 and τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 . By contrast,
if the tax base exceeds AT + (1+r)eH with LM = 1 − H, i.e. Fr > Hs(τ), they implement the
redistributive policy and extract from skilled workers until the net return to education becomes zero.
Then, all workers receive the same level of disposable non-capital income (net of the education cost),
thus maximizing unskilled workers’ disposable income is equivalent to maximizing Y˜L and the optimal
rate τy is selected. Further, unless Fr is fairly low, the allocation is efficient. Overeducation is avoided,
i.e. H ≤ H¦(τy), when Fr is very high, because unskilled workers choose x and T so that the net
return to education becomes zero at optimal H. Intuitively, redistribution from the educated to the
uneducated corrects the excessive private return. When Fr is low, the overexpansion of sector T is
averted, because redistribution corrects the insufficient return to choosing sector M. However, when
Fr is lower thanHopt(τy) ∈ (Hs(τy),H(τy)), whereHopt(τ) is Fr satisfying ∂YM∂LM = AT when H = Fr
and LT = 0, the redistributive policy overexpands sector M.
In the non-commitment case, the effect on H is not taken into account when the policy is de-
termined, thus the uneducated extract from the educated until the educated are indifferent between
skilled and unskilled jobs ex post, i.e. (1− x)wh = (1− x)wl + T . Then, the net return to education
30Since the LHS of the equation is wh from (24), the assumption can be expressed as
1−α
1−α(1−τh)wh−(1+r)e−
AT
1−τh > 0,
where wh =
1−α(1−τh)
1−α
∂YM
∂H
from (20) and (23) and wl = (1− τh) ∂YM∂LM = AT from (19) and LT > 0.
31On the (Fr , τ) plane, Fr =Hs(τ) is negatively (positively) sloped for τ < (>)τy, and Fr = H
¦(τ) when H¦(τ) >H(τ)
is positively (negatively) sloped for τ < (>)τy.
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becomes negative, thus nobody takes education and only sector T is active.
As for the desirable distribution of political power, the uneducated should have power from an
earlier stage of development than the economy without redistribution, where the educated should
determine τ when the unskilled wage is not affected by τ (Fr ≤H(τl)) and the uneducated should
have some influence on the policy for greater Fr . Now the uneducated should have decisive power for Fr
higher than some Fr ∈ (Hs(τy),Hopt(τy)), that is, even when sector T is active without redistribution.32
In particular, they must determine policies when Fr > H¦(τy) (only then can overeducation be
prevented) and when Fr <H(τy) (only then is the overexpansion of sector T averted). When Fr ∈
[H(τy), H¦(τy)], both groups choose optimal τ , but equality is realized and the speed of structural
change is faster with the dominance of the uneducated. By contrast, the educated should control
policies for Fr ≤Hs(τy)(<Hopt(τy)) due to the risk of destructive τ mentioned earlier.
4.2 When γb1−γb(1+r)AT < e
So far, the initial distribution of wealth does not affect the long-run outcome, since Frt always increases
over time when γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e. Now effects of the initial distribution are examined by considering
the case γb1−γb(1+r)AT < e. Remember that unskilled (skilled) workers gain (lose) access to education
over time if b∗l (wl,t) =
γb
1−γb(1+r)wl,t > e (if b
∗
h(wh,t) =
γb
1−γb(1+r) [wh,t − (1+r)e] < e), as detailed in
Section 3.3.2. Hence, when τ < τ s0 or τ > τ
b
0 and thus Ht = 0, b
∗
l (wl,t) =
γb
1−γb(1+r)AT < e and Frt
decreases. For τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ], the direction of motion of Frt depends on Frt and the tax rate.
First, consider the region where LT > 0 is satisfied, i.e. Fr < H(τ) on the (Fr , τ) plane. By
substituting (24) into the LHS of (37) and rearranging, b∗h(wh) = e can be expressed as
(1−α)AM
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−αΩ0(1−τ)
1
1−α
[
τ
(1−α)(1−τ)
] ρθ
δ−ρ−θ = eγb . (50)
The next lemma shows that, if the tax rate is very high or very small, b∗h(wh,t) < e and thus Frt
decreases over time, and it remains unchanged otherwise (see Figure 6 below).
Lemma 6 Assume (1−α)1− ρθδ−ρ−θAM
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−αΩ0(1− τh)
1
1−α
[
τh
1−τh
] ρθ
δ−ρ−θ > eγb
. Then, there exist
τ sh↓ ∈ (τ s0 , τh) and τ bh↓ ∈ (τh, τ b0 ) satisfying (50) such that, when LT,t > 0, Frt decreases over time for
τ < τ sh↓ and τ > τ
b
h↓ and is constant for τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ bh↓].
The result can be explained intuitively in a similar way to Lemma 2. Note that the assumption in the
lemma implies Assumption 1 (since γb1−γb(1+r)AT < e).
When LT = 0, b∗h(wh) and b
∗
l (wl) depend on H (= Fr in the unequal opportunity case) as well as
τ . By plugging (25) with H = Fr into the LHS of (37) and rearranging, b∗h(wh) = e is expressed as
AMΩ01−α[1−α(1−τ)]
(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α(
1−Fr
Fr
)α
= eγb . (51)
32The critical Fr is lower thanH
opt
(τy) because while sector M is oversized for Fr <H
opt
(τy) when the uneducated
determine policies, sector T is oversized for Fr <H(τy) when the educated determine policies.
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Given τ , when Fr is smaller (greater) than the value satisfying the equation, b∗h(wh) > (<)e holds.
Since the LHS of the equation equals wh when LT = 0, from Lemma 1, its locus is positively (nega-
tively) sloped for τ < (>)τh on the (Fr , τ) plane.
By plugging (26) with H = Fr into the LHS of (36) and rearranging, b∗l (wl) = e is expressed as
AMΩ01−αα(1−τ)
(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α(
Fr
1−Fr
)1−α
= [1−γb(1+r)]eγb . (52)
When Fr is greater (smaller) than the value satisfying the equation, b∗l (wl) > (<) e holds. Since the
LHS is wl when LT = 0, its locus is negatively (positively) sloped for τ < (>)τl on the (Fr , τ) plane.
The critical loci b∗h(wh) = e and b
∗
l (wl) = e when LT = 0 are effective at given Fr and τ only if
Fr ≥H(τ) and Fr ≤ H∗(τ), i.e. LT = 0 and H = Fr . In order for b∗l (wl) = e to be effective for
some Fr and τ , Assumption 1 needs to be replaced by the following assumption, which states that
b∗l (wl) = b
∗
h(wh) > e holds if the unskilled wage is highest (when Fr ≥ H∗(τ) and τ = τh).
Assumption 3 (1−α)(1−α)(1− ρθδ−ρ−θ )AMΩ1−α0
(
α
1−γb(1+r)
)α
(1−τh)
[
τh
1−τh
](1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
> eγb
The assumption implies the one in Lemma 6, which states that b∗h(wh) > e when LT > 0 and τ = τh,
and thus Assumption 1.
The next lemma shows that the two loci intersect at two tax rates that are in between the two
critical rates of Lemma 6, τ sh↓ and τ
b
h↓.
Lemma 7 b∗h(wh)=e and b
∗
l (wl)=e intersect at τ=τ
∗s∈(τ sh↓, τh) and τ=τ ∗b∈(τh, τ bh↓).
Clearly, the two loci intersect on Fr = H∗(τ). Based on Lemmas 6 and 7, the next lemma describes
the shape of the effective portion of b∗h(wh) = e when LT = 0 and its intersection with b
∗
h(wh) = e
when LT > 0 on the (Fr , τ) plane.
Lemma 8 When LT = 0, b∗h(wh) = e is effective for τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ ∗s] and τ ∈ [τ ∗b, τ bh↓] on the (Fr , τ)
plane. For τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ ∗s], it is positively sloped. For τ ∈ [τ ∗b, τ bh↓], its shape depends on the value of
τh relative to τ ∗b and τ bh↓: (i) if τh ≤ τ ∗b, it is negatively sloped, (ii) otherwise, it is positively sloped
for τ < min{τh, τ bh↓}, and, when τh < τ bh↓, negatively sloped for τ > τh. The curve intersects with
b∗h(wh) = e when LT > 0 on Fr =H(τ).
The curve is not effective for τ ∈ (τ ∗s, τ ∗b) because b∗h(wh) > e is satisfied for any Fr . Similarly, the
next lemma describes the shape of the effective portion of b∗l (wl) = e.
Lemma 9 When LT = 0, b∗l (wl) = e is effective for τ ∈ [τ ∗s, τ ∗b] on the (Fr , τ) plane. It is positively
sloped for τ > max{τl, τ ∗s}, and, when τl > τ ∗s, negatively sloped for τ < τl.
Proof. Can be proved similarly to Lemma 8.
The curve is not effective for τ < τ ∗s and τ > τ ∗b because b∗l (wl) < e always holds.
As shown in the two lemmas, shapes of effective portions of b∗h(wh) = e and b
∗
l (wl) = e and relative
positions of the two loci differ depending on the relative value of τh to τ ∗b and τ bh↓ and that of τl to
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s
Figure 6: Locations of b∗h(wh) = e and b
∗
l (wl) = e when
AT
e is low
τ ∗s. Figure 6 superimposes positions of the two loci on Figure 1 when τh < τ ∗b(< τ bh↓) and τl > τ
∗s. A
portion of b∗h(wh) = e that is not effective (for τ ∈ (τ ∗s,τ ∗b)) is represented with a dotted line.
4.2.1 Exogenous tax rate
Based on the above lemmas and discussions, the dynamics of Frt when the tax rate is fixed is sum-
marized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When γb1−γb(1+r)AT < e, the dynamics of Frt for given τ are as follows.
(i) For τ < τ sh↓ and τ > τ
b
h↓, Frt > 0 decreases over time.
(ii) For τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ bh↓] and Frt <H(τ), i.e. LT,t > 0, Frt is constant.
(iii) For τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ bh↓] and Frt ≥H(τ), i.e. LT,t = 0,
(a) For τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ ∗s) and τ ∈ (τ ∗b, τ bh↓], Frt decreases over time when b∗h(wh,t) < e, i.e. when
the economy is located at the right side of b∗h(wh) = e on the (Fr , τ) plane.
(b) Frt is time-invariant when b∗h(wh,t) ≥ e and b∗l (wl,t) ≤ e, that is, when the economy is
located at the left side (including the boundary) of b∗h(wh) = e or b
∗
l (wl) = e.
(c) For τ ∈ (τ ∗s, τ ∗b), Frt increases over time when b∗l (wl,t) > e, that is, when the economy is
located at the right side of b∗l (wl) = e.
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamics of Frt and other aspects of the economic structure when τh < τ ∗b
and τl > τ ∗s (the same case as Figure 6). The dynamics of sectoral and skill distributions of workers
and the wages are as presented in Proposition 1 if Frt increases (and opposite if Frt decreases).
The dynamics differ greatly depending on the initial distribution of wealth (transfers) and the tax
rate. When the tax rate is very low or very high, i.e. τ < τ sh↓ or τ > τ
b
h↓, from any initial distribution
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Figure 7: The dynamics when ATe is low and τ is fixed
of wealth, Frt decreases over time and Fr = 0 holds in the long run.33 In particular, the case in
which τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ sh↓) or τ ∈ (τ bh↓, τ b0 ] and Fr0 ≥ H∗(τ) are satisfied is worth mentioning. Initially all
workers are in sector M and equal opportunity is attained, but the wage is low (due to the sector’s low
productivity or the heavy tax burden) and thus such desirable state is not sustained. Less wealthy
individuals lose access to education gradually. After equal opportunity is lost and the proportion of
unskilled workers starts to increase, the unskilled wage falls and the skilled wage and wage inequality
rise over time. Eventually, unskilled workers become so abundant that some of them must seek jobs
in sector T. After that, the wages stabilize, but Frt continues to decrease due to low wh,t. In the long
run, nobody can afford education and only sector T is in operation.
By contrast, when the tax rate is in the intermediate range, i.e. τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ bh↓], the dynamics of Frt
are affected by the initial distribution of wealth as well. If Fr0 is small either because the economy’s
wealth is concentrated in the few rich or because the wealth is dispersed among the many poor (the
region with hatched lines in the figure), the proportion of unskilled workers is high and thus the
unskilled wage is too low for their descendants to gain access to education. As a result, Frt remains
unchanged, so as other aspects of the economy.
Alternatively, if Fr0 is relatively high, i.e. Fr0 is located at the right side of b∗h(wh) = e or
b∗l (wl) = e in the figure, the long-run outcome of the economy critically depends on the tax rate.
When τ ∈ [τ sh↓, τ ∗s) or τ ∈ (τ ∗b, τ bh↓], with high Ht, the skilled wage is not high enough for all progenies
of current skilled workers to access education, i.e. b∗h(wh,t) < e. Hence, Frt decreases over time, and
33 Because an increase in AT lowers wh when LT > 0 (equation 24), higher AT raises τ
s
h↓ and lowers τ
b
h↓. That is, in
the long run, Fr = 0 is more likely to happen with a ’bad’ tax policy, when the productivity of sector T is higher. This
result and the one in footnote 22 suggest that an appropriate choice of tax rate is particularly important in an economy
where the productivity of the traditional sector is not very low.
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Figure 8: The dynamics when ATe is low and τ is endogenous
in the unequal opportunity case, Ht and wl,t fall, while wh,t and the wage inequality go up. Decreases
in Frt and Ht stop once wh,t becomes high enough that b∗h(wh,t) ≥ e is satisfied. By contrast, when
τ ∈ (τ ∗s, τ ∗b), because of high productivity but moderate tax burden in sector M, b∗l (wl,0) > e is
satisfied initially. Thus, Frt increases over time, the economy goes through the structural change as
described in Proposition 1, and Fr = 1, H = H∗(τ), and wh−(1+r)e=wl hold in the long run.
Observe that the long run outcome can be very different depending on the tax rate even when the
economy starts with an identical distribution of wealth.34,35 This suggests the critical importance of
the distribution of political power, which is analyzed next.
4.2.2 Endogenous tax rate
Based on Figure 7 and Lemma 5 of Section 4.1.2, Figure 8 presents the dynamics of Frt and τ t
when τh < τ ∗b and τl > τ ∗s. The heavy solid (heavy dashed) line represents the dynamics when
educated (uneducated) individuals determine the tax rate. Short dashed lines represent equilibrium
combinations of Fr and τ when Frt is time-invariant.
When educated (uneducated) individuals determine the policy, Frt increases over time and equal
34 The efficiency of the governmental service also affects the outcome. If the efficiency declines, i.e. Ω0 decreases, from
(52), b∗l (wl) = e shifts to the right (and Fr =H(τ) shifts to the right, Fr = H
∗(τ) and b∗h(wh) = e shift to the left, τ
s
0
and τsh↓ increase, τ
b
0 and τ
b
h↓ decrease) in the figure, and thus the economy is more likely to stagnate. Further, when
unproductive public services are included into the model (see footnote 14), an increase in the proportion of such services
has the same qualitative effects. Consistent with this result, Keefer and Knack (1997) find that the growth of poor
countries is negatively affected by institutional quality, such as bureaucratic quality, the pervasiveness of corruption, the
risk of expropriation and contract repudiation by the government, and the rule of law.
35If sector T is not incorporated in the model, unskilled workers cannot escape from sector M when the tax
rate is very high, and thus the difference in the outcome becomes much smaller. In particular, from (51), if
α > (1−α)max
n
ρθ
σ−ρθ , 1− ρθσ−ρθ
o
, H > 0 for any τ . Hence, ignoring the presence of the informal/traditional sector
would underestimate negative effects of a bad tax policy.
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Figure 9: The dynamics when ATe is low and the uneducated determine τ and the redistributive policy
(the commitment case)
opportunity is attained in the long run, if Fr0 is located at the right side of b∗l (wl) = e at τ = τh
(τ = τl). The minimum level of Fr0 for reaching equal opportunity is lower, when the uneducated
choose the tax rate, because of higher wl for given Fr . In particular, if Fr0 is at the left side of
b∗l (wl) = e at τ = τh but at the right side of the locus at τ = τl, Frt increases (is constant) over time
when the uneducated (the educated) determine the policy. Thus, unlike the case γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e,
the uneducated should control the policy while Frt is in this range. By contrast, when Frt ≤H(τl),
allocating decisive power to the educated is even more important compared to the high productivity
case: if the uneducated have decisive power and are concerned about the wage inequality, there exists
non-negligible risk that τ > τ bh↓ or τ < τ
s
h↓ is selected and the economy ends up with Fr = H = 0.
4.2.3 When the redistributive policy is available
When the redistributive policy is available, the distribution of political power is even more critical for
the long-run outcome. When the educated determine policies, unskilled workers always receive AT
from Proposition 4 of Section 4.1.3, thus Frt and other aspects of the economy remain unchanged.36
By contrast, when the uneducated choose the policy, all workers receive the same amount (net of the
education cost) from Proposition 5, thus the dynamics of Frt differ greatly depending on Fr0 in the
commitment case. Figure 9 illustrate the dynamics (the dashed line) when τh < τ ∗b and τl > τ ∗s. For
given Fr , τ and the redistributive policy are determined as in Figure 5 of Section 4.1.3. Remember
that, when Fr ≤Hs(τ), the uneducated are indifferent among any policies that assure AT (thus any
dashed line is not presented in the figure). By contrast, when Fr >Hs(τ), Frt increases (decreases)
36To be more precise, in the non-commitment case, Frt decreases when Frt is very high, because all workers receive
AT at H =H
b(τy) (see Figure 4 of Section 4.1.3). In the commitment case, Frt never decreases from Assumption 3.
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over time at the right (left) side of the broken line, which is a combination of H = Fr and τ at which
workers receive 1−γb(1+r)γb e, net of the education cost.
37 Hence, if Fr0 is at the right side of the broken
line at τ = τy, Frt increases over time and H = H¦(τy) and Fr = 1 in the long run, while if Fr0 is at
the left side of the line, Frt decreases until Frt =Hs(τy), after which whether Frt decreases further
or not (constant) depends on chosen policies. The economy can attain successful development from
lower Fr0 than the economy without redistribution (see Figure 8).
The desirable distribution of political power is more evident, compared to the corresponding econ-
omy when γb1−γb(1+r)AT > e (Figures 4 and 5) and the economy without redistribution: the uneducated
(the educated) should determine policies for any Fr weakly higher (lower) than the level on the bro-
ken line at τ = τy.38 In particular, since the economy inevitably stagnates when the educated control
policies, the political dominance of the uneducated is a must for successful development.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed interactions among taxation, the provision of a productive public service,
human capital accumulation, and modernization based on a dynamic dual economy model, which draws
on the Becker and Murphy (1992) model of skill and task specialization, and examined conditions for
successful development. Distributions of political power and wealth as well as sectoral productivities
and the education cost have been found to affect the outcome qualitatively. In particular, the socially
desirable distribution of political power is such that educated (uneducated) individuals should have
dominant power at an early (late) stage of development. Further, it has been shown that several
novel or overlooked inefficiencies arise naturally from realistic features of the model and appropriate
redistribution can correct them except at a fairly early stage of development.
Several limitations remain in the analysis. First, the paper has focused mostly on the productive
governmental service, although qualities of public services such as the degree of corruption and quality
of bureaucracy are found to be important in development empirically (see Mo, 2001, and Easterly, 2007,
for example). While footnote 14 has shown that qualitative results are unchanged even when a portion
of officers are engaged in unproductive services and footnotes 19 and 34 have shown that the economy
is more likely to be underdeveloped and stagnate with an exogenous increase in such services, analyzing
endogenous determination of qualities of public services would be valuable. Second, the paper has not
endogenized transitions of political power between educated and uneducated individuals, although
whether or not and when transitions occur are crucial for the long-run outcome. While modeling
transitions within the present framework is straightforward,39 constructing a plausible model may not
37From the definition of the dashed line, it must not intersect with b∗h(wh) = e, and it must be located at the right side
of Fr =Hs(τ) and at the left side of b∗l (wl) = e, but, unlike the figure, it may be located at the right side of Fr =H(τ).
38To be more exact, if the critical Fr ∈ (Hs(τy),Hopt(τy)) of Section 4.1.3 is at the right side of the broken line and a
high priority is placed on present efficiency, both groups should have some power when Fr is lower than the critical level
and is weakly higher than the level on the broken line at τ = τy.
39Suppose that the probability of the power transition from the educated minority (they are the minority when
education is appropriately defined) to the uneducated majority increases with the relative per capita wealth and the
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be, since Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2008) find no causal effects of income per capita and average years
of education on democracy empirically. Improvements in these respects are left for future work.
Appendix: Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma 1 : (i) As for wl when LT =0,
∂wl
∂τ
R 0 ⇔
d
[
(1−τ)
(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α]
dτ R 0, (53)
⇔ ατ2+(1−α)[2−α ρθδ−ρ−θ ]τ−(1−α)2 ρθδ−ρ−θ Q 0 (∵ τ ∈ [0, 1]). (54)
At τ =0, the LHS of the last equation is negative, and at τ =1, the LHS=1+(1−α)(1− ρθδ−ρ−θ)> 0,
hence there exists unique τ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying ∂wl∂τ = 0 and the statement holds. The results for wh
when LT >0 and wh when LT =0 can be proved in a similar way.
(ii) Regarding wh when LT >0,
∂wh
∂τ
= 0 ⇔ d
[
(1−τ) 11−α ( τ1−τ ) ρθδ−ρ−θ ]
dτ
= 0 ⇔ τ = (1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ . (55)
It can be proved that, at τ = τh ≡ (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ , ∂wl∂τ < 0 and ∂wh∂τ > 0 when LT = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 : When LT > 0, from (24) and wl =AT , the wages are independent of H and
wh = 0 at τ = 0, 1. Thus, when τ is very large or very small, wh− (1+r)e < wl holds and H = 0.
wh−(1+r)e>wl and thus H>0 for an intermediate range of τ iff wh−(1+r)e>wl holds at τ maximizing
wh, i.e. τ = τh, which is Assumption 1. From Lemma 1, ∂wh∂τ > (<) 0 for τ < (>) τh, hence there exist
τ s0 <τh and τ
b
0 >τh satisfying wh−(1+r)e=wl and the statement holds. Further, LT =0 and thus H > 0
cannot hold for τ < τ s0 and τ > τ
b
0 , because, when LT =0, from (19) and wl≥AT , LM is smaller and
thus wh is lower (from equation 20) and wl is higher compared to the case LT >0.
Proof of Lemma 3 : For any τ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a single Fr ∈ (0, 1] satisfying (32), and when
τ = 0, 1, Fr = 1. Since
[ (1−τ)αAM
AT
] 1
1−αΩ
(
HG
H
)
in the denominator of the RHS of (32) is proportional
to (wl)
1
1−α when LT = 0 (from eq. 26), from Lemma 1, Fr =H(τ) decreases (increases) with τ for
τ < (>)τl. However, from Lemma 2, H=0 when τ <τ s0 or τ >τ
b
0 , hence Fr =H(τ) is defined only for
τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ] and its shape is as stated in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4 : [Existence of Fr = H∗(τ)] Given τ ∈ (0, 1), the LHS of (33) is decreasing in
Fr , equals +∞ at Fr = 0, and equals −∞ at Fr = 1. Thus, for any τ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a single
Fr ∈ (0, 1) satisfying (33). From Lemma 2, H = 0 for τ < τ s0 and τ > τ b0 , so the dividing line is
defined only for τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ].
[Existence of τeo ∈ (0, 1) and the shape of Fr = H∗(τ)]
relative size of the latter group and the effect of the per capital wealth is stronger. Then, the probability is low and
decreases with Fr when LT > 0, whereas it increases with Fr when LT = 0. Given Fr , the probability is lower when the
educated implement redistribution.
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∂(LHS of (33))
∂τ R 0 ⇔
∂
{[
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
]1−α
[1−Fr−α(1−τ)]
}
∂τ R 0
⇔ (1−α)
[
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1
τ −
(
1− ρθδ−ρ−θ
)
1
1−τ − α1−α(1−τ)
]
+ α1−Fr−α(1−τ) R 0 (56)
⇔−(1−α)[1−Fr−α(1−τ)]{τ − ρθ[1−α(1−τ)]δ−ρ−θ }+ατ(1−τ)[1−α(1−τ)] R 0. (57)
When τ − ρθδ−ρ−θ [1 − α(1 − τ)] ≤ 0 ⇔ τ ≤ (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ /[1− αρθδ−ρ−θ ] ∈ (τh, 1), ∂(LHS of (33))∂τ > 0 for any Fr
on the dividing line (where 1− Fr − α(1− τ) > 0 is satisfied), and thus the dividing line is positively
sloped in this interval. When τ − ρθδ−ρ−θ [1− α(1− τ)] > 0, from (57),
∂(LHS of (33))
∂τ R 0 ⇔ Fr R [1− α(1− τ)]
{
1− α(1−τ)τ
(1−α)
{
τ− ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [1−α(1−τ)]
}}
= [1−α(1−τ)] Q(τ)
(1−α)
{
τ− ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [1−α(1−τ)]
} , (58)
where Q(τ) ≡ (1−α){τ− ρθδ−ρ−θ [1−α(1−τ)]}−α(1−τ)τ . (59)
Since Q(0) < 0, Q(1) > 0, and Q
( (1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ /[1− αρθδ−ρ−θ ]
)
< 0, there exists a single τ ≡ τQ ∈
( (1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ /[1−
αρθ
δ−ρ−θ ], 1
)
satisfying Q(τ) = 0. For τ ≤ τQ, the RHS of (58) is non-positive, hence ∂(LHS of (33))∂τ > 0
for any Fr ∈ (0, 1) and Fr = H∗(τ) is positively sloped. For τ > τQ, on the other hand, the RHS of
(58) is positive, hence the sign of ∂(LHS of (33))∂τ must be checked for each combination of (Fr , τ) on the
dividing line. By substituting (58) into (33),
∂(LHS of (33))
∂τ R 0 at (Fr , τ) on Fr = H∗(τ) (eq. 33)
⇔AMΩ01−α
(
α(1−τ)
1−α(1−τ)
Q(τ)+τ
Q(τ)
)α(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α
[1−α(1−τ)]τ
Q(τ)+τ R(1+r)e (60)
⇔ AMΩ01−ααα(1−α)(1−α)(1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ ) τ
1+(1−α) ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)1−(1−α)
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
{Q(τ)}α{Q(τ)+τ}1−α R (1+r)e. (61)
Now it is proved that there exists a unique τeo ∈ (τQ, 1) satisfying the above equation with equality.
The shape of the LHS of the equation must be examined.
d
[
τ
1+(1−α) ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)1−(1−α)
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
{Q(τ)}α{Q(τ)+τ}1−α
]
dτ
R 0
⇔ [1 + (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ ] 1τ − [1− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ ] 11−τ − αQ′(τ)Q(τ) − (1−α)Q′(τ)+1Q(τ)+τ R 0, (62)
⇔Q(τ)[Q(τ)+τ ]
[
1+ (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ −2τ
]
−τ(1−τ){α[Q(τ)+τ ]Q′(τ)+(1−α)Q(τ)[Q′(τ)+1]}R0. (63)
Since 1 + (1− α) ρθδ−ρ−θ − 2τ = 1−α−Q
′(τ)
α , (63) is equivalent to
Q(τ)[Q(τ)+τ ]{1−α−Q′(τ)} − ατ(1−τ){Q(τ)Q′(τ)+ατQ′(τ)+(1−α)Q(τ)} R 0, (64)
⇔ [Q(τ)+ατ ]{Q(τ)[1−α−Q′(τ)]−ατ(1−τ)Q′(τ)}+(1−α)τQ(τ){1−α−Q′(τ)−α(1−τ)}R0. (65)
Because Q(τ) + ατ = [1− α(1− τ)]{τ − (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ } and 1− α −Q′(τ)− α(1− τ) = −α{τ − (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ },
the above equation is equivalent to
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[
τ− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
]{
[1−α(1−τ)][Q(τ)(1−α−Q′(τ))−ατ(1−τ)Q′(τ)]−α(1−α)τQ(τ)}R0, (66)
⇔
[
τ− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
]{
(1−α)Q(τ)(1−α−Q′(τ))−ατQ′(τ){Q(τ)+(1−τ)[1−α(1−τ)]}}R0, (67)
⇔(1−α)
[
τ− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
]{
Q(τ)(1−α−Q′(τ))−ατQ′(τ)
(
1− [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ
)}
R 0, (68)
⇔ R(τ) ≡ α(1−α)
[
τ− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
](
[1−α(1−τ)]
[
1+ (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ −2τ
](
τ− [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ
)
−(1−α)τ
{
1− [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ
})
R 0.
(69)
Since Q(τ) > 0 for τ > τQ, from (59),
(1− α){1− [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ } > (1− τ)[1− α(1− τ)]. (70)
By using the above inequality into the LHS of (69),
R(τ)<α(1−α)
[
τ− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
]
[1−α(1−τ)]
{[
1+ (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ −2τ
](
τ− [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ
)
−τ(1−τ)
}(
∵ τ >τQ> (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
)
(71)
< α(1−α)
[
τ− (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ
]
[1−α(1−τ)]
{[
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ −τ
](
τ− [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ
)
−(1−τ) [1−α(1−τ)]ρθδ−ρ−θ
}(
∵ τ >τQ>
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1− αρθ
δ−ρ−θ
)
(72)
< 0. (73)
Hence, the LHS of (61) decreases with τ for τ > τQ. Further, LHS→ +∞ as τ → τQ from above
and equals 0 at τ = 1. Therefore, there exists a unique τeo ∈ ( (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ /[1− αρθδ−ρ−θ ], 1) satisfying
∂(LHS of (33))
∂τ =0 on the dividing line. From Lemma 2, H=0 at τ <τ
s
0 and τ >τ
b
0 , so the dividing line
is defined for τ ∈ [τ s0 , τ b0 ]. Since ∂(LHS of (33))∂τ R 0 ⇔ τ Q τeo and the LHS of (33) is decreasing in Fr ,
the shape of the dividing line is as stated in the lemma.
[τeo>τh] Since
∂(LHS of (33))
∂τ =
∂wh
∂τ − ∂wl∂τ =0 and thus ∂wh∂τ and ∂wl∂τ must have a same sign at τ = τeo,
τeo>τh or τeo<τl. If τeo<τl, ∂wh∂τ >0 and
∂wl
∂τ <0 and thus the dividing line would be positively sloped
for τ ∈ (τl, τh), which is inconsistent with the shape of the line proved just above.
[The intersection with Fr=H(τ) ] Straightforward from the fact that wl=AT and wh−(1+r)e=wl are
satisfied at the intersection.
Proof of Proposition 1 : Except (ii)(a), the results are straightforward. (ii)(a) Since HG,tHt =
τ
1−α(1−τ)
(equation 23), when Ht increases, both HM,t and HG,t increase proportionally. Further, since the RHS
of (19) equals AT in this case, Ht and LM,t increase proportionally, while LT,t decreases.
Proof of Proposition 2 : (i) When τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ), if H ≤ H(τ) and thus wl = AT , Y˜L = [wh −
(1 + r)e]H + AT (1 − H), where wh is given by (24) and thus independent of H. Hence, ∂ eYL∂H =
wh − (1 + r)e−AT > 0 for H <H(τ) from Lemma 2 and (24), which implies H¦(τ) ≥H(τ).
Let Ψ(τ) ≡ AMΩ01−α
(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ)
)1−α
. If H >H(τ) and thus LT = 0, ∂
eYL
∂H = [wh −
(1 + r)e − wl] + ∂wh∂H H + ∂wl∂H (1 − H), where ∂wh∂H = −α[1 − α(1 − τ)]Ψ(τ)(H)−α−1(1 − H)α−1 from
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(25), ∂wl∂H = (1−α)α(1− τ)Ψ(τ)(H)−α(1−H)α−2 from (26), and wh− (1+ r)e−wl = [1−α(1− τ)−
H]Ψ(τ)(H)−α(1−H)α−1 − (1 + r)e from (25) and (26). Thus,
∂ eYL
∂H = (1− α−H)Ψ(τ)(H)−α(1−H)α−1 − (1 + r)e, (74)
∂2 eYL
∂H2
= −α(1− α)Ψ(τ)(H)−α−1(1−H)α−2 < 0. (75)
Besides (75), since limH→0 ∂
eYL
∂H = +∞, limH→1−α ∂
eYL
∂H = −(1 + r)e < 0, and ∂
eYL
∂H < 0 when H > 1−α,
for given τ , there exists unique H ∈ (0, 1 − α) satisfying ∂ eYL∂H = 0. If such H is greater thanH(τ), it
is H¦(τ), otherwise, H¦(τ) =H(τ).
WhenH¦(τ) >H(τ), since ∂wh∂H H+
∂wl
∂H (1−H) = −ατΨ(τ)(H)−α(1−H)α−1 < 0, wh−(1+r)e−wl >
0 when H = H¦(τ) and thus H¦(τ) < H∗(τ).
(ii) The result on H is from Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 (ii) and the rest of the proof is for the
result on Y˜L. In the equal opportunity case, Y˜L = wh−(1+r)e and (33) with Fr replaced by H is
satisfied. From this equation and (25),
wh
1−α(1−τ) = (1+r)e
1−H
1−H−α(1−τ) ⇔ H = [1−α(1−τ)][wh−(1+r)e]wh−[1−α(1−τ)](1+r)e . (76)
Substituting the above equation into (25),
wh = AMΩ01−α
(
α(1−τ)wh
wh−(1+r)e
)α(
τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
[
(1−τ)(1−α)]1− ρθδ−ρ−θ)1−α (77)
⇔ (wh)1−α[wh−(1+r)e]α = AMΩ01−ααα(1−α)(1−α)(1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ )τ
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)1−
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ . (78)
The LHS of (78) increases with wh and ∂RHS∂τ R0⇔ τQτh= (1−α)ρθδ−ρ−θ .
Proof of Lemma 5 : [Non-commitment case] The (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium tax rate is
obtained by examining the determination of the rate given the number of educated workers first and
then considering education decisions in childhood. Denote the number of educated workers by E.
(i) When E ≤ H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }), the wage-maximizing tax rate equals the rate in the lemma at
Fr=E (and H=E), which is proved from the shape of Fr=H(τ) (Lemma 3) and the association of wh
with τ and τl<τh<τh (Lemma 1). When E>H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }), τ=min{τh, τ b0 } and H = E if wh≥wl
at such τ and E, otherwise, τ=τh andH (∈ (H∗(τh), E)) is determined so that wh=wl, which is proved
from Lemma 1, the shape of Fr =H∗(τ) (Lemma 4), ∂wh∂H < 0 when LT =0, and H and τ satisfying
wh=wl is given by H=1−α(1−τ) and wh=wl is maximized at τ=τh. As for education decisions, if
Fr≤H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }), the net return to education at E=Fr is non-negative, thus E(=H)=Fr and the
equilibrium tax rate equals the wage-maximizing rate at E=Fr . Otherwise, E=H∗(min{τh, τ b0 })<Fr
and τ=min{τh, τ b0 } because the net return is negative if E>H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }).
(ii) When E ≤H∗(max{τl, τ s0 }), the wage-maximizing tax rate equals the rate in the lemma at
Fr =E, which can be shown based on shapes of the curves (Lemmas 3 and 4), wl=AT when LT >0,
and the association of wl (when LT =0) with τ and τl<τh (Lemma 1). When E>H∗(max{τl, τ s0 }),
τ = max{τl, τ s0 } and H = E if wh ≥ wl at such τ and E, otherwise, τ equals the minimum of τh
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and τ(> max{τl, τ s0 }) satisfying wh = wl at E (and H is determined so that wh = wl), which can
be proved based on Lemmas 1 and 4, ∂wl∂H > 0 when LT = 0, H and τ satisfying wh = wl is given
by H = 1−α(1− τ), and wh = wl increases (decreases) with τ for τ < (>)τh. As for education
decisions in childhood, if Fr≤H∗(max{τl, τ s0 }), the net return to education at E=Fr is non-negative,
thus E = Fr and the equilibrium tax rate equals the wage-maximizing rate at E = Fr . Otherwise,
E = H∗(max{τl, τ s0 })(< Fr) and τ = max{τl, τ s0 } since, if E > H∗(max{τl, τ s0 }), the net return is
negative with the wage-maximizing rate.
[Commitment case] In this case, τ and E are determined simultaneously.
(i) If Fr ≤H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }), wh when H=E=H∗(τ)<Fr , if such τ exists, is lower than wh when
H = E = Fr and τ equals the rate in the commitment case, because wh is maximized at such rate
when H = Fr and wh when H = H∗(τ) increases (decreases) with τ for τ < (>)τh from Proposition
2 (ii); thus, the result is same as the non-commitment case. If Fr >H∗(min{τh, τ b0 }), since wh when
H = H∗(τ) decreases with τ for τ > τh, wh when H = H∗(τ) and τ = min{τh, τ b0 } is lower than the
one when H = H∗(τ) and τ = τh, thus the result is as stated in the lemma.
(ii) If Fr ≤H(max{τl, τ s0 }), wl = AT for any τ and H ≤ Fr , thus the result is same as before.
If Fr ∈ (H(max{τl, τ s0 }),H∗(max{τl, τ s0 })], since wl when H = E = H∗(τ) < Fr (such τ exists only
when τl > τ s0 and thus τ < τl) is lower than wl when H = E = Fr and τ = τl from the fact that
wl is maximized at τ = τl when H = Fr and wl when H = H∗(τ) increases with τ for τ < τh
(from Proposition 2 (ii)), the result is same as before. When Fr > H∗(max{τl, τ s0 }), since wl when
H = H∗(τ) increases(decreases) with τ for τ < (>)τh, the result is as stated in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3 : (i) When LT = 0, Y˜L = AM(Ω0Ψ0(τ))
1−α(H)1−α(1−H)α−(1+r)eH, where
Ψ0(τ) ≡ τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−α)(1−τ)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ) , from (25) and (26). Then,
∂ eYL
∂τ =
∂Ψ0(τ)
∂τ (1−α)(Ψ0(τ))−αAMΩ01−α
(H)1−α(1−H)α, where
∂Ψ0(τ)
∂τ = Ψ0(τ)
[
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1
τ −
(
1− ρθδ−ρ−θ
)
1
1−τ − α1−α(1−τ)
]
=
(1−α) ρθ
δ−ρ−θ−
(
1−α ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
)
τ
τ(1−τ)[1−α(1−τ)] . (79)
Thus, ∂Ψ0(τ)∂τ R 0 ⇔ τ Q τy ≡
(1−α) ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
. From Lemma 1 (ii), τy > τh, and from (25), wh ∝
[1−α(1−τ)](Ψ0(τ))1−α and thus τy < τh. Further, τy < τ b0 must be true because Y˜L ≥ AT for any
τ and Y˜L = AT at τ = τ b0 . By contrast, when LT > 0, Y˜L = [wh − (1 + r)e]H + AT (1 − H), where
wh is given by (24), and ∂
eYL
∂τ > (<)0 for τ < (>)τh from Lemma 1. Based on these results, the tax
rate maximizing Y˜L for given Fr can be obtained as in the proof of the commitment case of Lemma
5 (i). Finally, the association between Y˜L and τ can be proved from these results and the shape of
Fr =H(τ) (Lemma 3, see Figure 3).
(ii) Y˜L = AMLMα
[
Ω
(
HG
H
)
H
]1−α + AT (1−H−LM) − (1 + r)eH from (18), where LM ≤ 1−H
and H ≤ Fr are determined so as to maximize Y˜L. Thus, for given Fr , the optimal HGH is the one
maximizing Ω
(
HG
H
)
, which equals ρθδ−ρ−θ from (15) and the corresponding τ in a decentralized economy
is τy from (23). (iii) From (i), (ii), and Lemma 5.
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Proof of Proposition 4 : [Existence of Hb(τ) and Hb(τ) > H∗(τ)]When LM = 1 − H, Y˜L equals
AM(Ω0Ψ0(τ))
1−α(H)1−α(1 − H)α − (1 + r)eH from the proof of Proposition 3 (i). From properties
of Y˜L in the proof of Proposition 2 (i), limH→0Y˜L = 0, and limH→1Y˜L = −(1 + r)e < 0, for given
τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ), there exist two H ∈ (0, 1) satisfying Y˜L = AT . The greater one,Hb(τ), is higher than
H∗(τ), since wl(τ ,H, 1−H) > AT and thus wh(τ ,H, 1−H) − (1 + r)e < wl(τ ,H, 1−H) at H =Hb(τ),
which can be shown from Y˜L > AT at H satisfying ∂
eYL
∂H = 0 and
∂ eYL
∂H < (>)0 for higher (lower) H
(from the proof of Proposition 2 (i)) and Y˜L > AT at H =H(τ).
(i) As long as the redistributive policy is feasible, i.e. wl(τ ,H,LM) > AT , and is implemented, i.e.
x, T > 0, (40) holds with equality. Then, xwl(τ ,H,LM) = wl(τ ,H,LM)−AT and the objective function
equals wh(τ ,H,LM) + LMH [wl(τ ,H,LM)−AT ]. Hence, in this case, the problem is simplified as:
max{LM ,τ}
{
wh(τ ,H,LM) + LMH [wl(τ ,H,LM)−AT ]
}
(80)
s.t. wh(τ ,H,LM) + LMH [wl(τ ,H,LM)−AT ]− (1 + r)e ≥ AT , (39’)
(42) and LM ≤ 1−H.
The derivative of the objective function with respective to LM is, from (19) and (20),
∂wh(τ ,H,LM )
∂LM
+ LMH
∂wl(τ ,H,LM )
∂LM
+ 1H [wl(τ ,H,LM)−AT ] = 1H
[
wl(τ ,H,LM )
1−τ −AT
]
, (81)
which is positive whenever wl(τ ,H,LM) > AT . Thus, if wl(τ ,H,1−H) > AT , i.e. H>H(τ), LM = 1−H
and x = wl(τ ,H,1−H)−ATwl(τ ,H,1−H) ; otherwise, LM is determined so that wl(τ ,H,LM) = AT and x = T = 0. Hence,
whenH>H(τ), the objective function is expressed as 1H{wh(τ ,H, 1−H)H+[wl(τ ,H,1−H)−AT ](1−H)} =
1
H {Y˜L − AT (1−H)} + (1+r)e, which increases (decreases) with τ for τ < (>)τy ∈ (τh,min{τh, τ b0 })
and is maximized at τ = τy from the proof of Proposition 3 (i), and approaches wh(τ ,H, 1−H) as
wl(τ ,H,1−H)→ AT . When H≤H(τ) and thus x = T = 0, ∂wh∂τ > (<)0 for τ < (>)τh from Lemma 1.
(a) From the above result and the shape of Fr =H(τ), when wl(τy,Fr ,1−Fr) ≤ AT , i.e. Fr ≤H(τy),
x = T = 0, H = Fr , LM is determined so that wl(τ ,Fr ,LM) = AT , and τ coincides with the rate
described in Proposition 3 (i).
(b) By contrast, when Fr >H(τy), if the redistributive policy is implemented, τ = τy, LM = 1−H,
and H = Fr for Fr ≤Hb(τy) and H =Hb(τy) otherwise (note eq. 42). If the policy is not implemented,
τ = τh, LM = 1−H, and H = H∗(τh) for large Fr(> H∗(τh)) from Lemma 5 (i) and the skilled wage
is highest among H and τ satisfying H = H∗(τ) from Proposition 2 (ii). The objective function when
x, T > 0, 1H {Y˜L −AT (1−H)}+ (1+r)e, decreases with H since
∂
[ eYL−AT (1−H)
H
]
∂H =
∂ eYL
∂H
H−eYL+AT
H2
= AT−wl
H2
< 0 (82)
from (74) in the proof of Proposition 2 (i). Thus, from H∗(τh) < H∗(τy) (from Lemma 4) and
Proposition 2 (ii), there exists Fr ∈ (H∗(τh),H∗(τy)) such that the educated strictly prefer the policy
without (with) redistribution for higher (lower) Fr .
39
(ii) The maximization problem determining policies is different from the commitment case in that
(39) is replaced by (1− x)wh(τ ,H,LM) + T ≥ (1− x)wl(τ ,H,LM) and (42) does not appear. As in the
previous case, when wl(τ ,H,LM) > AT and x, T > 0, (1 − x)wl(τ ,H,LM) = AT holds and the problem
can be simplified. The difference is that −(1+r)e does not appear in the LHS of the constraint for
skilled workers (the constraint is looser) and (42) does not appear in the problem. When H ≤H(τy)
or when H >H(τy) and the redistributive policy is implemented, the proof of the commitment case
applies and chosen policies are same. When H >H(τy) and x = T = 0, by contrast, LM = 1−H and
τ = min{τh, τ b0 }(> τy > τh) from Lemma 5 (i). Since τy is the rate maximizing net aggregate wage
and wl(min{τh, τ b0 },H,1−H) ≥ AT (= the amount unskilled workers receive when x, T > 0), for given
H, the policy with redistribution is always preferred to the one with x = T = 0.
Finally, taking into account the policy choice, H is determined. When Fr ≤H(τy), H = Fr as
before. When Fr >H(τy), since policies with x, T > 0 are always selected, H = Fr for Fr ≤Hb(τy)
and H =Hb(τy) otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 5 : (ii) is straightforward and is as explained in the main text.
(i) As long as the redistributive policy is feasible, i.e. wh(τ ,H,LM)− (1+ r)e−wl(τ ,H,LM) > 0, and
is implemented, i.e. x, T > 0, (45) holds with equality. Then, from (45) and (47), (1−x)wh(τ ,H,LM)−
(1+r)e = wl(τ ,H,LM)+ HLM xwh(τ ,H,LM)⇔ xwh(τ ,H,LM) =
LM
H+LM
[wh(τ ,H,LM)−(1+r)e−wl(τ ,H,LM)]
and thus the objective function becomes HH+LM [wh(τ ,H,LM)− (1 + r)e] +
LM
H+LM
wl(τ ,H,LM).
Hence, in this case, the maximization problem is simplified as:
max{H,τ}
{
H
H+LM
[wh(τ ,H,LM)− (1 + r)e] + LMH+LMwl(τ ,H,LM)
}
(83)
s.t. HH+LM [wh(τ ,H,LM)− (1 + r)e] +
LM
H+LM
wl(τ ,H,LM) ≥ AT , (46’)
(49) and H ≤ Fr .
Suppose (46’) does not bind. Then, LM = 1 − H and the objective function equals Y˜L =
AM(Ω0Ψ0(τ))
1−α(H)1−α(1−H)α − (1+ r)eH, where Ψ0(τ) ≡ τ
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ [(1−α)(1−τ)]1−
ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
1−α(1−τ) , from (25)
and (26). From the proof of Proposition 3 (i), ∂
eYL
∂τ R 0 for τ Q τy ∈ (τh,min{τh, τ b0 }), thus, as long as
Y˜L > AT at τ = τy, τy is the chosen rate. From the proof of Proposition 2 (i), for given τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ),
there exists unique H ∈ (0,H∗(τ)) satisfying ∂ eYL∂H = 0 and ∂ eYL∂H > (<)0 for lower (higher) H. From
Assumption 2 and Proposition 2 (i), at τ = τy, such H equals H¦(τy) from H¦(τy) >H(τy). Hence,
as long as Y˜L > AT at τ = τy, H = Fr when Fr ≤ H¦(τy) and H = H¦(τy) otherwise. Such policy
is feasible since H¦(τ) < H∗(τ). Further, the policy is preferred to x = T = 0, because, given Fr , it
maximizes net aggregate labor income and (1− x)wl + T = Y˜L.
Now binding (46’) is taken into account. The existence of H satisfying (46’) with equality when
LM = 1−H, that is, the existence ofHs(τ), is from the proof of Proposition 4. Clearly,Hs(τ) < H¦(τ).
Further,Hs(τ) <H(τ), that is, wl(τ ,Hs(τ), 1−Hs(τ)) < AT , from Y˜L = AT and wh(τ ,H, 1−H)− (1 +
r)e > wl(τ ,H, 1−H) at H =Hs(τ) (noteHs(τ)<H¦(τ)<H∗(τ)). Since ∂ eYL∂H > 0 at H =Hs(τ), Fr =
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Hs(τ) is negatively (positively) sloped for τ < (>)τy on the (Fr , τ) plane and thus Fr =Hs(τ) is lowest
at τ = τy. Hence, when Fr >Hs(τy), (46’) does not bind, thus the redistributive policy is implemented,
and τ , H, and LM are determined as stated above. When Fr ≤ Hs(τy), (46’) binds and thus the
uneducated cannot obtain more thanAT through policies, hence they are indifferent among any policies
with redistribution satisfying τ ∈ (τ s0 , τ b0 ), HH+LM [wh(τ ,H,LM) − (1 + r)e] +
LM
H+LM
wl(τ ,H,LM) = AT ,
H ≤ Fr , and LM ≤ 1−H and any policies with x = T = 0, including τ < τ s0 or τ > τ b0 .
Proof of Lemma 6 : Mostly, the proof of Lemma 2 can be applied with minor modifications. τ sh↓>τ
s
0
and τ bh↓<τh are from
γb
1−γb(1+r)AT <e. Since b
∗
l (wl,t)<e, b
∗
h(wh,t)≥e implies that Frt is constant.
Proof of Lemma 7 : [Existence of the intersection] By plugging (52) into (51) and deleting AMΩ01−α
×( τ ρθδ−ρ−θ [(1−τ)(1−α)]1− ρθδ−ρ−θ1−α(1−τ) )1−α(1−FrFr )α, 1−FrFr = α(1−τ)1−α(1−τ) 11−γb(1+r) . By plugging this equation into (51),
(1−α)(1−α)(1− ρθδ−ρ−θ )AMΩ01−α
[
α
1−γb(1+r)
]α
τ
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)1−
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ = eγb . (84)
τ ∗s and τ ∗b are solutions to this equation. For the two loci to intersect at two distinct τ ∈ (0, 1), the
LHS of the equation at τ = τh =
(1−α)ρθ
δ−ρ−θ (the rate maximizing the LHS) must be greater than the
RHS, which is Assumption 3.
[τ ∗s ∈ (τ sh↓, τh) and τ ∗b ∈ (τh, τ bh↓)] τ ∗s < τh < τ ∗b is obvious from above. As for τ ∗s > τ sh↓ and τ ∗b < τ bh↓,
by comparing the LHS of the equation determining τ ∗s and τ ∗b (eq. 84) with the one determining τ sh↓
and τ bh↓ (the LHS of the condition in Lemma 6 with τh replaced by τ),(
LHS of the equation for τ ∗s and τ ∗b
)
R
(
LHS of the equation for τ sh↓ and τ
b
h↓
)
⇔
[
α
1−γb(1+r)
]α
R (1−α)α(1− ρθδ−ρ−θ )Ω0α
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−α
τ
αρθ
δ−ρ−θ (1−τ)α( 11−α− ρθδ−ρ−θ ) (85)
⇔ AT1−γb(1+r) R (1−α)
1− ρθ
δ−ρ−θAM
(
αAM
AT
) α
1−αΩ0(1−τ)
1
1−α
[
τ
1−τ
] ρθ
δ−ρ−θ
, (86)
where the RHS is same as the LHS of the equation in Assumption 1 (with τh replaced by τ). Since
γb
1−γb(1+r)AT <e, Assumption 1 implies that the RHS is greater than the LHS. That is, the LHS of the
equation for τ sh↓ and τ
b
h↓ is greater than the one for τ
∗s and τ ∗b and τ ∗s>τ sh↓ and thus τ
∗b<τ bh↓.
Proof of Lemma 8 : b∗h(wh)=e when LT =0 is not defined for τ <τ
s
h↓ and τ >τ
b
h↓, because b
∗
h(wh)<e
when LT >0 from Lemma 6. From Lemma 7, the locus intersects with b∗l (wl)=e at τ = τ
∗s∈ (τ sh↓, τh)
and at τ =τ ∗b∈ (τh, τ bh↓), so b∗h(wh)=e is located to the right side of b∗l (wl)=e for τ ∈ (τ ∗s, τ ∗b) on the
(Fr , τ) plane. Then, if b∗h(wh)=e were effective in this tax range, b
∗
l (wl)>b
∗
h(wh) ⇔ wl>wh−(1+r)e
on b∗h(wh) = e, which cannot happen. Hence, Fr =H
∗(τ) must be located between the two loci and
b∗h(wh)>e for any H when τ ∈(τ ∗s, τ ∗b). The rest of the result is straightforward.
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